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STRICT SCRUTINY ACROSS THE BOARD:
THE EFFECT OF ADARAND
CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. PENA
ON RACE-BASED
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment' ensures
individuals equality under the law.' Nowhere is this more true than in the
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they re-
side. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the "power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id.
The Court also recognizes a corresponding equal protection guarantee, applying to the
actions of Congress, incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See
generally Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55
N.C. L. REV. 541 (1977) (examining the Court's treatment of Fifth Amendment equal pro-
tection claims). See also infra notes 65-85 and accompanying text (discussing the progres-
sion of Supreme Court decisions culminating in the recognition of the Fifth Amendment's
equal protection component).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The importance of equality has been espoused
since the birth of our nation: "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are
created equal .. " THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). While the
notion of equality was a distinctive feature of the early American spirit, it remained un-
secured for American citizens until the inclusion of the Equal Protection Clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment. WILLIAM D. GUTHRIE, LECTURES ON THE FOURTEENTH ARTI-
CLE OF AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTrrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 107-08 (1898).
By the Fourteenth Amendment, the principle of equality before the law, a princi-
ple so vital and fundamental in American institutions, ceased to be a mere theory
or sentiment, or an implied condition, and became incorporated into the organic
law as the fundamental right of every individual .... The provision, if properly
construed, assures to every person within the jurisdiction of any State, whether he
be rich or poor, humble or haughty, citizen or alien, the protection of equal laws,
applicable to all alike and impartially administered without favor or
discrimination.
Id. at 110; see also GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITuTION: A
COMMENTARY 178 (1995) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause made explicit in the
Constitution the American principle of equality dating back to the Magna Carta and pro-
claimed in the Declaration of Independence).
Indeed, those supporting the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment advocated the
need to make all citizens equal in the eyes of the law. See CHESTER J. ANTIEAU, THE
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realm of racial discrimination.3 Ratified after the Civil War as one of the
Civil War Amendments,4 the Fourteenth Amendment represented the
ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 14-17 (1981) (quoting the
statements of various politicians debating the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment).
For example, Senator John Sherman of Ohio asserted that all people "should stand equal
before the law." Id. at 16. Similarly, Senator Lyman Trumbull argued that the amendment
"would put in the fundamental law the declaration that all the citizens were entitled to
equal rights in this Republic ...." Id. at 15. For an extensive discussion of the legislative
history of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the
Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985).
In recent years, the Equal Protection Clause has been increasingly targeted as the most
important guarantee of an individual's right to equality under the law. JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.1 (5th ed. 1995); see also Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291-92 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (noting that
following the substantive due process era, the Equal Protection Clause attained newfound
vitality as a protection against discrimination). In fact, shortly after its adoption, one au-
thor predicted that the equal protection guarantee would "probably be found in the future
to be the most important and far-reaching of the provisions of... [the Fourteenth] amend-
ment." GUTHRIE, supra, at 108.
3. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (stating that, "the central pur-
pose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from
official sources in the States"). Indeed, the desire to secure the rights of the newly emanci-
pated slaves and prevent further discrimination against all blacks prompted the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., ANASTAPLO, supra note 2, at 178; GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 399 (12th ed. 1991); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 120 (1994); Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1475 (1995); Samuel L. Starks, Understanding Government Affirm-
ative Action and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 41 DUKE L.J. 933, 942 (1992); see also
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) ("The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in
the States."); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879) (positing that the Four-
teenth Amendment "was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all the
civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons").
Despite this central purpose, the Framers of the Equal Protection Clause utilized broad
terminology, intimating the Clause's applicability to all types of discriminatory legislation.
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 293 (opinion of Powell, J.) (stating that although the Framers in-
tended to bridge the gap between the white majority and the black minority, "the Amend-
ment itself was framed in universal terms, without reference to color, ethnic origin, or
condition of prior servitude."); see also infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke). Based on political commentary proffered through-
out the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, there appeared to be a general
understanding that the Clause would protect whites and blacks. ANTIEAU, supra note 2, at
24-25. But see Spann, supra, at 1475 (stating that the drafters intended to punish the south-
ern whites, not protect them).
4. Prior to the Civil War, there were no constitutional protections against the govern-
ment's ability to limit an individual's rights solely because of race. GUTHRIE, supra note 2,
at 107-08. Rather, slavery existed as a constitutionally permissible institution. See gener-
ally ROBERT B. SHAW, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES (1991)
(discussing in detail the origins and existence of slavery in the United States). In fact,
South Carolina delegate Pierce Butler drafted a fugitive slave provision that was later in-
corporated into the Constitution in 1787:
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nation's first significant step toward racial equality.5 Since then, Congress
has utilized its authority sporadically to enact legislation aimed at com-
No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping
into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged
from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to
whom such service or labor may be due.
Id. at 234. Because this provision proved insufficient, Congress passed the Fugitive Slave
Act of 1793 and later, the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. Id. at 235-39. The Supreme Court
upheld the legislation granting slave-owners the right to recapture slaves. See Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 539, 625-26 (1842) (invalidating a state law that held
slave catchers liable for kidnapping, as contrary to the Constitution). Tension mounted,
however, between the North and South in part because the northern states passed personal
liberty laws preventing the return of fugitive slaves, and granted fugitive slaves rights not
recognized under federal law. See SHAW, supra, at 244 (discussing an 1840 New York law
that gave fugitive slaves the right to trial by jury). Slavery legally ended during the Civil
War upon President Abraham Lincoln's issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation.
PERRY, supra note 3, at 117.
Shortly after the Civil War, Congress ratified the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments to the Constitution, commonly referred to as the Civil War Amendments.
ANASTAPLO, supra note 2, at 168-70.
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery in the United States. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIII, § 1. It states, "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." Id. This amendment applies even where
no state action occurs. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 14.7, at 642.
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment grants certain individual rights that must be
upheld by the states. See supra note 1 (providing the text of this section). Section One of
the Fourteenth Amendment contains a due process guarantee like that of the Fifth
Amendment, as well as the express guarantee of equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. Section Two mandates that states count all people as whole for purposes
of representation in Congress, displacing the constitutional provision that treated slaves as
three-fifths of a whole. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. It also reduces a state's representa-
tion in Congress if that state denies any male citizen the right to vote. Id.
The Fifteenth Amendment expressly precludes the use of race as a basis for denying a
citizen's right to vote. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1. It states: "The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Id. These amendments, as a
whole, represent the congressional desire to ensure liberty for the freed slaves following
the Civil War. E.g., ANASTAPLO, supra note 2, at 169-70; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
2, § 14.7, at 643; Seth Hilton, Comment, Restraints on Homosexual Rights Legislation: Is
There a Fundamental Right to Participate in the Political Process?, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REV.
445, 450 (1995).
5. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872) (asserting that
the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to protect the "newly-made freeman" from
the domination and oppression of the majority class); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2,
§ 14.7, at 643 (explaining the desire shared by a large portion of the population, especially
in the North, to safeguard the freedom and social equality of the freed slaves).
Despite this primary purpose, the Equal Protection Clause protects all people, regard-
less of race, assuring all citizens equal treatment under the law. See supra notes 2-3 and
accompanying text. Unfortunately, the promise of equality has gone largely unfulfilled.
Gerald S. Janoff, Comment, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: The Supreme Court to
Decide the Fate of Affirmative Action, 69 TULANE L. REV. 997, 997 (1995).
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batting race discrimination.6 The quest for equality continues today, evi-
Following the Civil War, the South continued to subordinate the freed slaves through the
Black Codes. PERRY, supra note 3, at 117. These laws limited the rights of the former
slaves, such as the freedom to purchase land. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 70
(describing the Black Codes). Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to invalidate
the Black Codes; shortly thereafter, Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment.
PERRY, supra note 3, at 118. The Fourteenth Amendment, in large part, constitutionalizes
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id.; ANTIEAU, supra note 2, at 2. Thus, the Fourteenth
Amendment finally made explicit the country's commitment to equality. GUTHRIE, supra
note 2, at 110.
The monumental task of achieving the goal of equality was hindered, in large part, by
the decisions of the Supreme Court following the Civil War. See, e.g., Mary C. Daly, Re-
building the City of Richmond: Congress's Power to Authorize the States to Implement
Race-Conscious Affirmative Action Plans, 33 B.C. L. REV. 903, 908 (1992) (noting that
several of the post-Civil War decisions prevented the progress of racial equality); Will Mas-
low & Joseph B. Robison, Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for Equality, 1862-1952, 20
U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 370-73 (1953) (discussing several Court decisions that limited the
scope of the Civil War Amendments and Congress's enforcement legislation). For exam-
ple, the Court found that under the Civil Rights Act of 1870, Congress did not have the
power to impose criminal punishments for wrongdoings at elections. James v. Bowman,
190 U.S. 127, 142 (1903). In another case, the Court invalidated the first two sections of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 because they applied to private action and thus were not
authorized by the Thirteenth or the Fourteenth Amendments. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 25-26 (1883).
6. Even before the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress attempted to
curtail race discrimination through the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Civil Rights Act of 1866,
ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). See supra note 5 (briefly discussing this Act). The Act provided:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and con-
vey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none
other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Id. ch. 31, § 1. Because Congress doubted its authority to create the Act and feared the
Act's subsequent repeal, Congress incorporated the fundamental principles of the Act into
the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., ANTIEAU, supra note 2, at 2; Maslow & Robison, supra
note 5, at 368. Section Five of the Amendment gave Congress the explicit "power to en-
force, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 5.
Soon after the States ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress, now confident in its
power to do so, enacted additional laws aimed at protecting civil rights. See, e.g., Civil
Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875) (prohibiting discrimination in public places
including inns, theaters, and public conveyances); Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat.
13 (1871) (imposing civil penalties on anyone depriving another of his civil rights); Civil
Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870) (enforcing the right of all citizens to vote, as
well as imposing criminal penalties for fraud and other malfeasances in federal elections).
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denced by large disparities among races in education,7 employment
status,8 and income,' as well as the government's continuing effort to im-
Unfortunately, several Supreme Court decisions limited the effect of these statutes. See
supra note 5 (discussing a number of these decisions).
Congress spent the next several decades attempting to override state statutes aimed at
subjugating blacks in various areas, such as voting. See Maslow & Robison, supra note 5,
at 373-80 (discussing in detail the schemes used by states to inhibit blacks' right to vote).
Indeed, the "separate but equal doctrine" allowed states to enforce separation of the races
in education, transportation, recreation, and public accommodations. Id. at 386-89 (exam-
ining segregation and the Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896)).
Following the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, codifying the country's renewed commitment to racial equality after nearly fifty
years of segregation. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1994), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6
(1994)) (broadly prohibiting racial discrimination in public places).
Title VII of this Act banned employment discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex or national origin, and created the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission
(EEOC). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994). In 1972, the powers of the EEOC were expanded by
an amendment to Title VII that enabled the Commission to sue employers acting in a
discriminatory manner. Equal Opportunity Employment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(c)-2000e-17 (1994)). It also
brought actions by state and local governments, as well as federal administrative agencies,
under the breadth of the statute. Janoff, supra note 5, at 1008. See Michael K. Braswell et
al., Affirmative Action: An Assessment of Its Continuing Role in Employment Discrimina-
tion Policy, 57 ALB. L. REV. 365, 368-72 (1993) (describing the history of federal affirma-
tive action policies relating to employment); Daron S. Fitch, Note, The Aftermath of
Croson: A Blueprint for a Constitutionally Permissible Minority Set-Aside Program, 53
OHIO ST. L.J. 555, 558 (1992) (discussing the ability of government agencies to utilize af-
firmative action policies under the Title VII amendments).
7. For example, in 1994, 22.9% of whites completed four or more years of college,
compared to only 12.9% of blacks and 9.1% of Hispanics. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1995 157
(115th ed. 1995) [hereinafter CENSUS]. In that same year, 82% of whites completed at least
four years of high school, compared to 72.9% of blacks, and 53.3% of Hispanics. Id. See
also Starks, supra note 3, at 934 nn.5-8 (providing further statistical evidence of the ine-
quality between blacks and whites).
8. In 1994, 3.3% of all lawyers were black, and 3.1% of lawyers were Hispanic; 3.7%
of engineers were black, while 3.3% of engineers were Hispanic; 24% of all social workers
were black, while 7% were Hispanic; 29.3% of all nursing aides, orderlies, and attendants
were black, and 8.9% were Hispanic; 4.2% of physicians were black, and 5.2% of physi-
cians were Hispanic; 17.9% of cooks were black, while 16.8% were Hispanic. CENSUS,
supra note 7, at 411-13.
In 1994, 5.8% of white high school graduates were unemployed, while 12.2% of black
high school graduates, and 8.3% of Hispanic high school graduates were unemployed. Id.
at 422. See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2135 n.3 (1995) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (discussing the persistent discrimination against black and Hispanic job
applicants). In a 1990 study conducted by the Urban Institute, white job applicants re-
ceived 52% more job offers than equally qualified Hispanics. Harry Cross et al., Employer
Hiring Practices: Differential Treatment of Hispanic and Anglo Job Seekers, URB. INST.
REP. 90-4 42 (1990), cited in Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2135 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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plement race-based affirmative action1° programs.11
9. In 1993, whites had a median household income of $32,960, while $19,533 was the
median for blacks, and $22,886 was the median for Hispanics. CENSUS, supra note 7, at
469. For each dollar earned by a white male, white females earn 75 cents, black males earn
74 cents, black females earn 63 cents, Hispanic males earn 63 cents, and Hispanic females
earn 56 cents. Patsy Bakunin, Affirmative Action Still Necessary. Women and Minorities,
Patsy Bakunin Says, Must Protect Meager Progress They've Made, PHOENIX GAZETTE,
Nov. 16, 1995, at B7.
10. "Affirmative action programs" are described as:
Employment programs required by federal statutes and regulations designed to
remedy discriminatory practices in hiring minority group members; i.e. positive
steps designed to eliminate existing and continuing discrimination, to remedy lin-
gering effects of past discrimination, and to create systems and procedures to pre-
vent future discrimination; commonly based on population percentages of
minority groups in a particular area. Factors considered are race, color, sex, creed
and age.
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 59 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
Affirmative action programs, generally, provide preferences in the distribution of social,
economic, or public benefits to certain people because of their membership in a particular
group. Lucy Katz, Public Affirmative Action and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Frag-
mentation Theory after Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Fed-
eral Communications Commission, 17 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 317, 320 (1992). The goal of
these preferences is to redress past harm suffered by members of that particular group. Id.
These programs also are labelled "benign" or "remedial" preferences. Id.; see also Bras-
well et al., supra note 6, at 366 (defining affirmative action).
The federal government's definition of affirmative action, as set forth by the Equal Op-
portunity Employment Commission, includes "actions appropriate to overcome the effects
of past or present practices, policies, or other barriers to equal employment opportunity."
29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (1995); see infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text (discussing the
origins of affirmative action programs).
Affirmative action programs may be utilized in a variety of areas, such as education,
employment, housing, and voting. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 477 (1989) (construction contracts); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616,
619 (1987) (employment promotions); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 197 (1979) (collective-bargaining); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
269-70 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (graduate school admissions). In addition, Congress
has enacted a variety of affirmative action programs. See, e.g., Surface Transportation
Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097, 2100 (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 101
(1994)); Job Training Partnership Act, Pub. L. No. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1322, 1390 (codified at
29 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1781 (1994)); Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28,
91 Stat. 116, 117 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6736 (1994)). Since the advent of affirma-
tive action, over 160 federal affirmative action programs have been established. Jeffrey A.
Roberts and Steve Lipsher, Vote '96: A question of color, THE SUNDAY DENy. POST, Nov.
19, 1995, at Al, A16.
Although continuously controversial, media attention recently has focused on affirma-
tive action due to the upcoming Presidential election. See id. (discussing the affirmative
action positions of various Presidential hopefuls). For example, Robert Dole (R-Kan.)
introduced legislation to eliminate affirmative action. Id. at A17. President Clinton sup-
ports affirmative action, but concedes that changes must be made. Id.; see also Adriel
Bettelheim, Preference in hiring a hot issue, THE SUNDAY DENy. POST, Nov. 19, 1995, at
A16 (describing Senator Hank Brown's (R-Colo.) role in the Senate hearings aimed at
revamping federal affirmative action programs).
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The Supreme Court developed three standards of review to analyze
governmental classifications that purportedly violate an individual's equal
protection rights.12 The most lenient standard, the rational relationship
test, grants a high level of deference to the legislature and requires that
the classification be rationally related to a legitimate governmental pur-
pose.13 The middle level of review, intermediate scrutiny, demands that
the governmental classification have a substantial relationship to an im-
portant governmental interest.14 The most stringent standard, strict scru-
11. Affirmative action programs do succeed in satisfying judicial scrutiny. See, e.g.,
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185-86 (1987) (affirming a district court's imposi-
tion of a race-conscious remedy on the Alabama Department of Public Safety); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (finding constitutional a ten
percent minority business enterprise set-aside provision imposed by the federal govern-
ment); Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 815 F. Supp. 1454, 1471 (S.D. Fla. 1993)
(upholding an affirmative action plan designed by Dade County to increase diversity
among its firefighters), affd, 26 F.3d 1545 (11th Cir. 1994).
12. E.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 14.3; Daly, supra note 5, at 923-24;
Katz, supra note 10, at 322-28; Starks, supra note 3, at 944-45.
13. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 14.3, at 601. Prior to the 1930s, the Supreme
Court gave little deference to legislatures enacting economic legislation. Id. § 11.4, at 384.
By the early 1930s, the Court began to depart from its stringent review of such legislation.
See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (upholding state regulation of milk); see
also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 394 (1937) (finding a Washington state
minimum wage law constitutional).
Since then, the Court's application of the rational relationship test has resulted most
often in the validation of economic and social welfare laws and regulations. See, e.g., Pen-
nell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 15 (1988) (upholding a rent control ordinance); New
York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 594 (1979) (refusing to invalidate, under
the rational relationship test, a New York Transit Authority policy forbidding the hiring of
methadone users); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (find-
ing a rational basis for a law limiting the ability to fit eyeglasses); Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-11 (1949) (applying the rational basis test to uphold a
New York advertising law); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
335 U.S. 525, 537 (1949) (sustaining a "right-to-work" law). But see Morey v. Doud, 354
U.S. 457, 469 (1957) (holding that a law exempting currency exchanges of certain compa-
nies from statutory requirements violated equal protection), overruled by City of New Or-
leans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to a federal minority preference program), overruled in part by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
223-24 (1982) (using intermediate scrutiny to review a law denying non-citizen school chil-
dren the right to public schooling); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (invalidating
an Oklahoma statute that disallowed males, but allowed females, between eighteen and
twenty years old to purchase beer). The Court in Craig articulated the test: "To withstand
constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." Id. at 197.
The intermediate standard is much less deferential to the legislature and typically is ap-
plied in cases involving gender and illegitimacy classifications. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 2, § 14.3. See generally Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the
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tiny, requires that a classification be "necessary" or "narrowly tailored"
to a "compelling" governmental purpose.' 5 Racial classifications inten-
tionally imposed by the government for invidious 6 reasons automatically
Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983) (discussing gender classifications in employment).
See also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's
recent mandate for strict scrutiny review of all race-based affirmative action programs will
make it easier for the government to enact gender-based affirmative action programs, as
gender-based programs are subject to the less stringent intermediate review).
15. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (ordering strict scrutiny review of all federal,
state, and local governmental race-based affirmative action programs); City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (calling for strict
scrutiny review of a local minority business preference program based on race); Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984) (invalidating a judge's order that mandated the removal
of a child from her mother because of her mother's marriage to a black man). Strict scru-
tiny review allows courts to make an independent assessment of a classification, giving
little or no deference to the government's purported purpose. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 2, § 14.3.
The justification for applying strict scrutiny review to certain governmental classifica-
tions derives from Justice Stone's opinion in United States v. Carolene Products. 304 U.S.
144, 152 (1938) (applying the rational basis test to uphold legislation prohibiting the inter-
state shipment of filled milk). Justice Stone acknowledged, in footnote four, the potential
need to apply "more exacting judicial scrutiny" to protect "discrete and insular minorities"
from prejudice that "curtail[s] the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities." Id. at 152-53 n.4. See generally Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action and the
Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 685 (1991) (discussing the impact of
Justice Stone's reliance on the political powerlessness of minorities and his application to
those disadvantaged under affirmative action programs).
Courts also apply strict scrutiny review in analyzing challenges to laws that restrict "fun-
damental rights," those rights protected by the Constitution as determined by the courts.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 11.4, at 383-84. In addition to the fundamental rights
made explicit in the Bill of Rights, the Court recognizes additional rights, not specifically
enumerated in the text of the Constitution, as fundamental. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (including the right to have an abortion as part of the fundamental
right to privacy); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (recognizing a fundamen-
tal right to interstate travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)
(designating as fundamental the right to vote); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-
86 (1965) (invalidating a law that prohibited the use of contraceptives by married couples
as an infringement of their right to privacy). Although they are not made explicit in the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has nonetheless found that these rights are protected by
various provisions of the Constitution, such as the First Amendment. See, e.g., Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (recognizing that freedom of association
is protected by the First Amendment); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23
(1960) (same); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (same).
Courts have experienced difficulties in applying strict scrutiny review, especially in ana-
lyzing affirmative action programs involving race-based preferences. See infra note 241
(discussing lower courts' uncertainty in applying strict scrutiny to minority preference pro-
grams after Croson).
16. "Invidious" is defined as "arbitrary, irrational and not reasonably related to a le-
gitimate purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 826 (6th ed. 1990). The Supreme Court,
however, has not determined its interpretation of the term "invidious." Mark Strasser, The
Invidiousness of Invidiousness: On the Supreme Court's Affirmative Action Jurisprudence,
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are subject to strict scrutiny review.17 Where "benign" racial classifica-
tions are employed under affirmative action programs, however, the
Court has alternated between the use of intermediate scrutiny and strict
scrutiny review.' 8
21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 323, 327 (1994). "Invidious," as utilized by the Court, some-
times implies arbitrary. Id. Accordingly, some courts hold that statutes burdening individ-
uals without an appropriate justification are unconstitutional. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (voiding a statute that prevented illegitimate children from receiving
damages for their mother's death).
The Court in other cases requires animus before finding a policy invidious. Strasser,
supra, at 327. For example, the Court did not find unconstitutional a New York City
transit policy that affected mostly black and Hispanic employees. New York Transit Auth.
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 579 (1979). The Court apparently required some evidence of ani-
mus, such as intentional discrimination or bias. Strasser, supra, at 332.
In other situations, an invidious statute connotes one that adversely affects a fundamen-
tal right or a group. Id. at 332-36. In sum, the definition of "invidious" appears to change
based on the type of case the Court addresses, and is therefore an elusive concept. See id.
at 339 (suggesting that the Court clarify its definition of invidious by refraining from calling
arbitrary laws and laws involving fundamental rights "invidious," and instead requiring
some evidence of animus before labelling a law "invidious").
17. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding that a race-based statute
prohibiting interracial marriage failed "rigid" scrutiny). In Loving, a white man and a
black woman, married in the District of Columbia, moved to Virginia and were subse-
quently indicted for violating a Virginia statute banning interracial marriages. Id. at 2-3.
After pleading guilty, and receiving a suspended sentence for agreeing to move to the
District of Columbia, the Lovings challenged the constitutionality of Virginia's anti-misce-
genation statutes under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 3. The Supreme Court re-
versed the convictions because, "tihere is patently no legitimate overriding purpose
independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification." Id. at 11.
As the statute applied only to marriages involving white people, the Court found that the
purpose could only be to further white supremacy. Id. Three years earlier, the Court
applied "rigid" scrutiny to a Florida law prohibiting a black man and white woman, or a
white man and a black woman, from occupying the same room at night. McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). Florida argued that the statute furthered the legitimate
purpose of "prevent[ing] breaches of the basic concepts of sexual decency." Id. at 193.
The Court acknowledged the importance of this purpose, but found no justification for
punishing one racial group and not another for the same act. Id.; see also DERRICK A.
BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 53-62 (2d ed. 1980) (describing the origins
and ultimate eradication of anti-miscegenation laws). Professor Bell discusses various the-
ories attempting to explain the motivations underlying the anti-miscegenation laws. Id. at
62-69. For example, one commentator argued that the laws furthered economic exploita-
tion of blacks and the desire to prevent blacks from attaining the cultural status of whites.
Id. at 64. Few scholars, however, agree with this theory. Id. at 65. The more accepted
view cites society's fear and contempt for interracial relations as the primary motivating
factors behind these statutes. Id.
18. Compare Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to a federal race-based affirmative action program), overruled in part
by Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) with City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 493 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (utilizing the strict scrutiny standard to review a
city's benign preference program). See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2,
§ 14.10 (discussing the standards applied in determining the legitimacy of various affirma-
tive action programs). See also infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text (discussing in
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:1405
In a 1961 executive order,19 President John F. Kennedy first directed
the use of affirmative action, instructing employers to take "affirmative
action" to ensure equal opportunity for workers."° President Lyndon B.
Johnson furthered the federal commitment to equal employment oppor-
tunities in 1965 by signing Executive Order 11,246, requiring all federal
agencies to establish equal employment plans.21 Since then, affirmative
action programs have been embroiled in endless controversy. 22 The le-
detail the distinction between standards applied to federal and state affirmative action
programs).
19. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1961), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 3301 (1994). Then Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson was instrumental in crafting the
government's first affirmative attempt to provide blacks with equal opportunities. Starks,
supra note 3, at 937-38. Prior to this executive order, however, the government used the
term "affirmative action" in the Wagner Act of 1935, which instructed the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) "to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of em-
ployees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act." National
Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 449 Stat. 454 (1935).
20. DANIEL C. MAGUIRE, A CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 31 (1992). The Execu-
tive Order prohibited discrimination against employees and mandated the aggressive re-
cruitment of minorities. See Lara Hudgins, Comment, Rethinking Affirmative Action in the
1990s: Tailoring the Cure to Remedy the Disease, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 815, 819 (1995)
(describing the history of affirmative action).
21. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965). Section 102 provided: "The head of
each executive department and agency shall establish and maintain a positive program of
equal employment opportunity for all civilian employees and applicants for employment
within his jurisdiction in accordance with the policy set forth in Section 101." Id.
President Johnson recognized the need to take significant steps to open the doors of
employment opportunity to those groups who had been shut out in the past because of
racial discrimination. MAGUIRE, supra note 20, at 31.
Despite opposition, constitutional challenges to programs effected under this Order
were rejected. See Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 177 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (upholding the Philadelphia Plan, an affirma-
tive action program that required bidders on federally-funded construction projects to sub-
mit minority hiring goals, as valid under Executive authority).
The Philadelphia Plan was the government's first affirmative action program, addressing
discrimination in the construction industry. Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate over
Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 893, 896 (1994). Due to controversy, the Plan was
soon revoked. Id. The Nixon Administration, however, revived the Plan after eliminating
the quota requirement of the original program. Id. See generally Robert P. Schuwerk,
Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. CHI.
L. REV. 723 (1972) (discussing the history of the Philadelphia Plan).
George Shultz, former Secretary of Labor, assisted in creating the Philadelphia Plan in
1969. George Shultz Backs Initiative to Scrap Affirmative Action, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23,
1996, at B3. Shultz, currently a professor at Stanford University, recently stated that af-
firmative action is "counterproductive." Id. He believes that "affirmative action programs
have taken on a 'bureaucratic life of their own' and foster racial tensions." Id.
22. PERRY, supra note 3, at 155; see LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND JUSTICE 556 (1992)
(presenting a brief overview of the arguments for and against affirmative action programs).
Proponents of affirmative action argue that people belonging to certain disadvantaged
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gality of various aspects of the concept have culminated in multiple
Supreme Court opinions.23 Unfortunately, the Court's decisions have
groups need special programs to remedy past bias and discrimination. Id. Opponents
claim that such preferences victimize other groups and result in reverse discrimination. Id.;
see also Braswell et al., supra note 6, at 401-18 (providing a detailed description of the
arguments for and against affirmative action). Supporters argue affirmative action is nec-
essary to remedy identifiable discrimination, discrimination that is specific and proven. Id.
at 402-04. Indeed, the Supreme Court continuously has insisted upon evidence of identi-
fied discrimination before acknowledging the constitutionality of an affirmative action
plan. Id. at 403; cf City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989) (re-
jecting the city's program because it was based on a "generalized assertion that there has
been past discrimination in an entire industry"). Proponents also emphasize the need for
affirmative action to remedy societal discrimination and to construct a racially integrated
society. Braswell et al., supra note 6, at 404-06; see also Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990) (finding the promotion of "programming diversity" an important
governmental objective based on congressional findings of discrimination against minori-
ties in the communications industry), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). Finally, those favoring affirmative action programs assert that
these programs help to make reparations for the evils of slavery, and to equalize the pref-
erences which were bestowed on whites for decades. Braswell et al., supra note 6, at 407-
10. For example, Justice Marshall argued that the long-held position of inferiority held by
blacks throughout history justifies affording blacks greater protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 401 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall further opined that because the doors of opportunity have
been shut to blacks, by permitting government to consider race in deciding who shall oc-
cupy positions of power and prestige, the doors will open. Id. at 401-02.
Those who criticize affirmative action contend that such programs constitute reverse dis-
crimination, and generate harmful effects by creating a stigma and imposing feelings of
shame and inferiority on those receiving preferential treatment. See, e.g., Adarand 115 S.
Ct. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring) (asserting that preference programs "stamp minorities
with a badge of inferiority" and may "provoke resentment among those who believe that
they have been wronged by the government's use of race"); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (opin-
ion of O'Connor, J.) (warning that "[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger of stig-
matic harm" and "may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority"). Opponents also
argue that affirmative action fails to remedy the consequences of discrimination and is
ineffective, failing to reach those who truly need its benefits. Braswell et al., supra note 6,
at 416-17; see, e.g., Clarence Thomas, Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables: Too
Tough? Not Tough Enough!, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 402,402-03 (1987) (arguing that the
Supreme Court's approval of employment goals and timetables based on race and gender
will not end employment discrimination); Paul M. Barrett, SBA Minority Set-Aside Raises
Questions, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1996, at B1l (questioning the disadvantaged status of a
one-time millionaire who was presumed disadvantaged under the Small Business Act be-
cause of his Asian heritage); James P. Pinkerton, Why Affirmative Action Won't Die, FOR-
TUNE, Nov. 13, 1995, at 192 (noting that opponents criticize affirmative action programs
because they fail to help those most in need, such as the "bottom quintiles of the black
community").
23. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 511 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (invalidating a city-
wide affirmative action plan because the city failed to provide sufficient evidence of identi-
fiable discrimination); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579
(1984) (limiting the scope of affirmative action programs to those that do not unduly bur-
den the majority class); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 199-208
(1979) (upholding a plan that reserved 50% of the slots in an employee training program
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failed to clarify the constitutionality of affirmative action programs. 24
In its most recent affirmative action decision, Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena,25 the Supreme Court sought to add "consistency" and "con-
gruence" to this area of the law.26 The decision simplified affirmative
action jurisprudence by mandating the application of strict scrutiny re-
view to all preference programs that impose racial classifications. 27 The
Court, however, failed to provide sufficient guidance to lower courts in
their application of the strict scrutiny standard; for this reason, the confu-
sion surrounding affirmative action is likely to endure.28
The Petitioner in Adarand, a subcontracting firm owned by a white
male,29 submitted the lowest bid for the guardrail portion of a federal
highway construction project.3° The Central Federal Lands Highway
for black trainees as non-violative of Title VII's prohibition against racial discrimination in
the work place); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-20 (opinion of Powell, J.) (allowing a California
medical school to use race as one factor in its admissions process).
24. See MAGUIRE, supra note 20, at vii (prefacing his book by commenting on the
Supreme Court's contribution to the confusion surrounding affirmative action). Maguire
claims the Court has "struggled clumsily with this topic" and is the "fountainhead of this
confusion." Id. at vii-viii; see also Jennifer M. Bott, From Bakke to Croson: The Affirma-
tive Action Quagmire and the D.C. Circuit's Approach to FCC Minority Preference Policies,
58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 845, 847 (1990) (discussing the Supreme Court's failure, prior to
Adarand, to establish a consistent standard for reviewing affirmative action cases); Michel
Rosenfeld, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Affirmative Action at the Crossroads of Con-
stitutional Liberty and Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 583, 593 (1991) (describing affirmative
action jurisprudence as a "complex, tortuous, and fragmented landscape"). As a result of
this confusion at the Supreme Court level, both affirmative action supporters and dissent-
ers can derive support from "the ambiguities and inconsistencies embedded in the relevant
judicial precedents." Id.
25. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
26. Id. at 2111. See infra notes 158-66 and accompanying text (explaining the major-
ity's intent to uphold consistency and congruence in the Court's affirmative action
jurisprudence).
27. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated,
"we hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." Id.
28. The Supreme Court remanded the case, directing the lower court to apply strict
scrutiny to the minority preference program at issue, but giving the court little guidance
concerning how that task should be accomplished. Id. at 2118; see infra notes 237-41 and
accompanying text (discussing the limited guidance provided by the Adarand majority).
29. Randy Pech is the white owner of Adarand Constructors, Inc., located in Colorado
Springs, Colorado. Jeff Thomas, Denver summit reveals racial divide, COLO. SPRINGS GA-
ZETTE TEL., Nov. 19, 1995, at B6. Mr. Pech recently spoke out against the government's
use of affirmative action programs at a summit called by the Colorado Democratic Leader-
ship Council and the Colorado chapter of Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition. Id. Mr.
Pech stated that he competes with four other companies in Colorado, all of them owned by
minorities and women. Id. One of them is three or four times bigger than Adarand. Id.
"'To tell me I don't get the contract and the only reason is I'm the white guy on top-that,
to me, is repulsive."' Id.
30. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2102 (1995).
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Division, a branch of the United States Department of Transportation,
awarded the prime contract to Mountain Gravel & Construction Com-
pany (Mountain Gravel).3 Under the Surface Transportation and Uni-
form Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 (STURAA),32 at least ten
percent of the funds appropriated for the construction project had to be
disbursed to small businesses owned by qualified "socially and economi-
cally disadvantaged individuals."33 STURAA borrowed the definition of
"disadvantaged" from the Small Business Act,34 including the presump-
tion that Blacks, Hispanics, Asian Pacifics, Subcontinent Asians, and Na-
tive Americans, as well as other groups designated by the Small Business
Administration, are socially disadvantaged.35
The prime contractor in Adarand could receive a bonus of ten percent
of the final subcontract amount if it employed at least one certified disad-
vantaged business. 36 Because Mountain Gravel would receive a mone-
31. Id.
32. Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132 (1987).
33. Id. § 106(c)(1), 101 Stat. 145 (1987). The Act states in relevant part that "not less
than 10 percent" of the appropriated funds "shall be expended with small business con-
cerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." Id.
34. Id. § 106(c)(2)(B), 101 Stat. 146 (1987). The Small Business Act defines "socially
disadvantaged individuals" as "those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice
or cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a group without regard to their
individual qualities." 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5) (1994). The Act further defines "economically
disadvantaged individuals" as "those socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to
compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and
credit opportunities as compared to others in the same business area who are not socially
disadvantaged." Id. § 637(a)(6)(A) (1994).
35. 49 C.F.R § 23.62 (1994). Qualified third parties are permitted, by regulation, to
challenge the "disadvantaged" status of a specific business. Id. § 23.69. A significant por-
tion of the oral argument before the Supreme Court in Adarand, however, focused on
whether or not third parties actually could or had ever challenged a "disadvantaged"
designation. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) available in No. 93-1841, 1995 WL 61020, at *29-*32. Justice
Scalia asked the Government's attorney whether or not there were documented instances
in which third parties, like Adarand, had successfully challenged an entity's status as a
disadvantaged business. Id. at *30. The attorney did not know of any. Id. Rather, the
cases cited by the government involved situations where the procurement officer bore the
burden of challenging the status of the business as disadvantaged. Id. at *31-*32. Justice
Scalia suggested that this procedure indicates that the rebuttable presumption is in fact a
conclusive presumption. Id. at *31.
36. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2103-04. The applicable clause in the prime contract in-
cluded a "Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) Development and Subcontracting
Provision," offering monetary compensation to the prime contractor for the hiring of dis-
advantaged subcontractors. Id. at 2103. Certification as a DBE could be granted by the
United States Small Business Administration, or a state highway agency. Id. Certification
by other governmental agencies could be acceptable on an individual basis. Id. at 2103-04.
Evidence of the subcontractor's certification had to be presented to the engineer. Id. at
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tary bonus for awarding the subcontract to a statutorily-defined socially
and economically disadvantaged business, it chose Gonzales Construction
Company, a certified Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE), instead
of the low bidder, Adarand.3' Thereafter, Adarand filed suit against fed-
eral officials in the United States District Court for the District of Colo-
rado claiming that the statutory race-based presumptions incorporated in
the subcontract violated Adarand's rights under the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment. 38 Applying intermediate scrutiny,
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Govern-
ment.39 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, n° and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.4 '
Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion, with four Justices dis-
senting.42 The majority held that all racial classifications imposed by any
governmental actor 43 must be reviewed under strict scrutiny." This deci-
2104. The clause also described the extent of the financial bonus awarded to the prime
contractor:
The Contractor will be paid an amount computed as follows:
1. If a subcontract is awarded to one DBE, 10 percent of the final amount of
the approved DBE subcontract, not to exceed 1.5 percent of the original con-
tract amount.
2. If subcontracts are awarded to two or more DBEs, 10 percent of the final
amount of the approved DBE subcontracts, not to exceed 2 percent of the orig-
inal contract amount.
Id.
37. Id. at 2102. Mountain Gravel's Chief Estimator conceded that Adarand's bid
would have been accepted if not for the additional monetary incentive Mountain Gravel
received for hiring the Gonzales Construction Company. Id.
38. Id. at 2104.
39. Id. The district court used the less rigorous standards of review illustrated in Fulli-
love v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547
(1990), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995),
which also involved equal protection challenges arising under the Fifth Amendment.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240, 243-44 (D. Colo. 1992), affd sub
nom. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995). The district court granted summary judgment to the government after deter-
mining that the DBE program served important governmental objectives and was narrowly
tailored to achieve these objectives. Id. at 244-45.
40. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537, 1547 (1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the DBE program was
constitutional because it was narrowly tailored to achieve the significant governmental pur-
pose of aiding disadvantaged businesses. Id.
41. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 41 (1994).
42. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2101. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas formed the majority, while Justices Stevens, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer dissented. Id.
43. The Constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws limits only those act-
ing on behalf of the government. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 629, 639-
40 (1883) (invalidating, as beyond the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, a statute that
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sion overruled prior holdings that had imposed a less stringent standard
of review on benign federal racial classifications than the standard im-
posed on benign state and local governmental racial classifications.4 5 The
majority rooted its decision in three fundamental propositions regarding
racial classifications: skepticism, consistency, and congruence. 46 The ma-
jority's decision clearly resolved the question of which standard courts
must use in reviewing all governmental affirmative action programs, yet it
failed to sufficiently clarify the proper application of this standard, leav-
ing affirmative action in a continued state of uncertainty.47
This Note first traces the history of equal protection jurisprudence in
depth, focusing on the enforcement of equal protection rights in the
realm of race discrimination under the Fourteenth and the Fifth Amend-
ments. It next discusses the two different standards previously used to
review invidious and benign racial classifications imposed by federal and
state actors. This Note then summarizes the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions in Adarand. An analysis of these differing opinions
follows, concluding that the majority's decision to require strict scrutiny
prohibited private individuals from conspiring to deny another equal protection of the
laws). The Court stated:
As, therefore, the section of the law under consideration is directed exclusively
against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the State or
their administration by her officers, we are clear in the opinion that it is not war-
ranted by any clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Id. at 640.
44. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113. The Court first found Adarand eligible for declara-
tory and injunctive relief from future subcontracts containing the monetary incentive
clause. Id. at 2104-05. Adarand satisfied the two-part test, set forth in Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), used to determine whether a party has standing to seek
prospective relief. Id. The test required Adarand to demonstrate that the future use of
subcontractor compensation clauses would cause "an invasion of a legally protected inter-
est which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical." Id. at 2104 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560) (citations omitted). Adarand
met the first requirement because it alleged a particularized invasion of its right to equal
protection of the laws. Id. at 2104-05. The Court also found that because Adarand proved
that it bids on every guardrail project in Colorado, and on average, at least one and one
half of the guardrail contracts per year contain a subcontractor compensation clause simi-
lar to the one in this case, the invasion was imminent. Id. at 2105. Thus, Adarand had
standing to sue. Id. See generally Spann, supra note 3 (discussing the law of standing as
applied to affirmative action).
45. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990) (applying inter-
mediate scrutiny to two FCC affirmative action policies), overruled in part by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). But see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (requiring strict scrutiny review of
Richmond's minority set-aside program).
46. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111; see also infra notes 153-66 and accompanying text
(discussing the three propositions).
47. See infra notes 237-46 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty courts
have had, and will have, applying strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs).
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review of all governmental race-based affirmative action programs coin-
cides with the underlying values of equal protection, but also invites fur-
ther affirmative action litigation.
I. EQUAL PROTECrION OF THE LAWS
A. Early Enforcement Under the Fourteenth and the Fifth Amendments
Although the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not apply exclusively to race discrimination,48 the Court, in one of
its earliest decisions following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, invalidated a racially discriminatory West Virginia statute on the
grounds that it violated equal protection.49 The Court in that case ac-
knowledged that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was, in large
part, to secure to the former slaves and their progeny "all the civil rights
... enjoyed by white persons."5 In later opinions, the Court attempted
to further define the scope of the equal protection doctrine as it applied
to the states.51
48. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 133 (1993); see Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291-92 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (explaining that de-
spite the drafters' intent to protect the rights of the newly freed slaves, the broad terminol-
ogy of the Fourteenth Amendment protects all people from all types of discrimination); see
also Antieau, supra note 2, at 24-25 (same).
49. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303, 310 (1879) (holding that a West
Virginia statute, permitting only white males to serve as jurors, discriminated against black
males on trial in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). The applicable statute provided
that "'All white male persons who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this
State shall be liable to serve as jurors, except as herein provided."' Id. at 305. The Court
found that this law denied blacks equal protection by disallowing a black defendant to be
tried by a jury that included members of his own race. Id. at 308-09. The Court conceded
that laws requiring jurors to be males, citizens, and of a certain age and educational status,
are valid. Id. at 310. Where the law excludes an individual from a jury panel "because of
color alone," however, the law violates equal protection. Id. at 309.
50. Id. at 306.
51. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that the
"separate but equal" doctrine was inappropriate in the context of education because segre-
gation in public schools is inherently unequal); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-36
(1950) (finding that Texas's attempt to provide legal education for blacks at the Texas State
University for Negroes was unequal to the education received by whites, and subsequently
ordering the University of Texas Law School to admit a black man); Sipuel v. Board of
Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948) (compelling the University of Oklahoma to admit a
black woman to its school of law); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 352
(1938) (ordering the University of Missouri to admit a black man to the law school since no
alternate legal institution existed for black people in the State); Cumming v. Richmond
County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 543-45 (1899) (giving Virginia school board members
substantial discretion in maintaining the equality of segregated high schools); Plessy v. Fer-
guson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (finding that the enforcement of separation by race in
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While the Court struggled to apply the Equal Protection Clause con-
sistently to race-based state statutes, it was slow to find a corresponding
Fifth Amendment52 federal equal protection guarantee. 53 In Hirabayashi
v. United States,54 the Court first reviewed a challenge to a race-based
federal statute, failing to find an equal protection guarantee in the Fifth
Amendment.55 In Hirabayashi, an American citizen of Japanese ancestry
was convicted of violating the Act of March 21, 1942,56 by ignoring a
wartime curfew imposed only on individuals of Japanese descent.57 Hira-
bayashi challenged the curfew as discriminatory.58 Although the Court
agreed that distinctions based on ancestry "are by their very nature odi-
ous to a free people," it nevertheless upheld the curfew and the convic-
public accommodations did not violate equal protection), overruled by Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. V:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
Id.
53. See, e.g., Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943) (noting that the
Fifth Amendment does not protect individuals against discriminatory legislation enacted
by Congress); Helvering v. Lerner Stores Corp., 314 U.S. 463,468 (1941) (opining that "[a]
claim of unreasonable classification or inequality in the incidence or application of a tax
raises no question under the Fifth Amendment, which contains no equal protection
clause"); LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392 (1921) (stating that "[tihe
Fifth Amendment has no equal protection clause").
54. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
55. Id. at 100. The Court stated that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is the
only limit on Congress's ability to legislate discriminatorily. Id.
56. Id. at 83. The Act provided:
[W]hoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or
military zone prescribed .... shall, if it appears that he knew or should have
known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that his act was
in violation thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be
liable. ...
Id. at 87-88 (quoting Act of March 21, 1942, 18 U.S.C. § 97(a) (1942)).
57. Id at 83-84. The Court determined that Congress had the authority to enact this
legislation based on exigencies created by World War II. Id. at 93-95. In dealing with the
"perils of war," including the dangers of espionage and sabotage by Japanese-Americans,
and the threat of invasion, the Court held that Congress had the power to take into ac-
count facts and circumstances necessary to the protection of the public welfare. Id. at 100-
01. In effect, the Court applied the rational basis test. Id. at 101-02.
58. Id. at .100.
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tion because of the importance of ensuring national defense during a time
of war.59
Shortly thereafter, in Korematsu v. United States,60 the Court faced a
similar challenge to a federal wartime order that excluded Japanese per-
sons from certain areas of the West Coast.61 It again upheld the order as
necessary to the prevention of wartime espionage and sabotage. 62 Before
doing so, however, the Court expressed its distaste for racial classifica-
tions by noting that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect" and should be subject to
the "most rigid scrutiny., 63 Courts frequently have relied upon this brief
dictum to determine the applicable standard of review for evaluating
governmental racial classifications purportedly violative of the equal pro-
tection guarantee of both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments.
64
B. Federal Duty to Uphold Equal Protection of the Laws is the Same
as the State
Although not explicitly stated until several years after Hirabayashi and
Korematsu,65 the Supreme Court began to invalidate federal laws
employing race classifications under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
59. Id. at 102.
60. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
61. Id. at 215-16. The Court compared the case to Hirabayashi, holding that the exclu-
sionary order at issue, while more intrusive than the curfew in Hirabayashi, had a "definite
and close relationship" to preventing wartime threats. Id. at 217-18.
62. Id. at 218-19. Justice Murphy dissented, arguing that the exclusionary order "falls
into the ugly abyss of racism." Id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting). He further stated,
"[bleing an obvious racial discrimination, the order deprives all those within its scope of
the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 234-35.
Congress has recently acknowledged the injustices imposed on Japanese Americans dur-
ing World War II, and has tried to make amends. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1989a(a) (1994)) (recogniz-
ing the "grave injustice" incurred by individuals of Japanese ancestry); see also id. § 1989b-
4(a)(1) (providing restitution for eligible injured parties).
63. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
64. See, e.g., Wittmer v. Peters, 904 F. Supp. 845, 849-50 (C.D. II1. 1995) (citing Hiraba-
yashi as justification for finding racial classifications irrelevant and therefore prohibited);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)
(quoting Hirabayashi and Korematsu for the proposition that racial distinctions are in-
nately suspect and warrant exacting judicial review); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
192 (1964) (citing prior case law for the proposition that heightened scrutiny is necessary to
eliminate governmental racial discrimination); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)
(calling for strict review of racial classifications imposed by the federal government).
65. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (expressly stating that
the "Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been pre-
cisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment").
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Clause using an implicit equal protection concept.66  In Boiling v.
Sharpe,67 the Supreme Court banned, on due process grounds, segrega-
tion in the District of Columbia's public school system. 68 Acknowledging
that there is no explicit Equal Protection Clause in the Fifth Amendment,
the Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
stems from a similar notion of fairness.69 The Court reiterated an earlier
premise set forth in Gibson v. Mississippi7" that the duty of the federal
government to avoid racial classifications should be the same as that of
the states.71
The Court continued to rely on the theory that the federal and state
obligation to uphold equal protection of the laws must be consistent.72 In
McLaughlin v. Florida,3 the Court faced a challenge to a Florida statute
prohibiting black men and white women, or black women and white men,
66. See Boiling, 347 U.S. at 500 (finding it impossible that the Constitution would im-
pose lesser requirements on the federal government to uphold citizens' equal protection
rights than it would on state governments).
67. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
68. Id. at 500 (holding that racial segregation is an improper governmental objective,
constituting a denial of due process).
69. Id. at 499. The Court conceded that "'equal protection of the laws' is a more
explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law,"' but nonetheless ac-
knowledged that racial discrimination without justification could violate due process. Id.
70. 162 U.S. 565 (1896). The Gibson Court, addressing an allegation of discrimination
brought against the state of Mississippi in its jury selection for the murder trial of a black
man, articulated the proposition that discrimination by both the "General Government"
and the states is forbidden by the Constitution. Id. at 591. The Court stated:
All citizens are equal before the law. The guarantees of life, liberty and property
are for all persons, within the jurisdiction of the United States, or of any State,
without discrimination against any because of their race. Those guarantees, when
their violation is properly presented in the regular course of proceedings, must be
enforced in the courts, both of the Nation and of the State, without reference to
considerations based upon race.
Id.
71. Boiling, 347 U.S. at 500. The Court stated that "it would be unthinkable that the
same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government" than it does on
the states. Id.; see Karst, supra note 1, at 554 (noting that courts assess Fifth Amendment
equal protection challenges using Fourteenth Amendment equal protection precedents).
72. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) (relying on the Boiling decision to
invalidate, under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, a federal statute that dis-
criminated against naturalized citizens). In Schneider, the State Department refused to
grant a passport to a German national who had acquired American citizenship but had
lived in Germany for several years. Id. at 164. The Department based its decision on a law
that called for termination of citizenship for naturalized citizens who had resided for three
years in their place of birth or the place where they were formerly a national. Id. The
Court found that this statute unjustifiably discriminated against naturalized citizens, in vio-
lation of the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee, as it was based on the impermissi-
ble assumption that naturalized citizens are less loyal to the United States. Id. at 168.
73. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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from occupying the same bedroom at night.74 Using prior decisions in-
volving federal race-based statutes as precedent, the Court invalidated
this state law because it violated equal protection.75
Similarly, in Loving v. Virginia ,76 the Court borrowed the equal protec-
tion principles enumerated in earlier decisions involving federal race-
based statutes to sustain an equal protection challenge to a state statute.77
Loving argued that a Virginia law banning interracial marriages violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. 78 The Supreme Court agreed, citing Hira-
bayashi and Korematsu to explain why distinctions based solely upon race
encroach the doctrine of equality embedded in the Constitution.79
74. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.05 (West 1992) (repealed 1969). The applicable statute
stated:
Negro man and white woman or white man and Negro woman occupying same
room: 'Any negro man and white woman, or any white man and negro woman,
who are not married to each other, who shall habitually live in and occupy in the
nighttime the same room shall each be punished by imprisonment not exceeding
twelve months, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars.'
McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 185 n.1 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.05 (West 1992) (repealed
1969)).
75. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192-96. Noting that the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to ensure the elimination of state-supported racial discrimination, the
Court held that racial classifications are "'constitutionally suspect."' Id. at 192 (quoting
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)). The Court continued by observing that such
classifications are therefore subject to the "most rigid scrutiny."' Id. (quoting Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
76. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
77. Id. at 11. The Loving Court quoted text from Hirabayashi and Korematsu to de-
nounce laws based on racial distinctions. Id.
78. Id. at 3; see also supra note 17 (discussing the facts of Loving). The Virginia stat-
ute provided in pertinent part: "All marriages between a white person and a colored per-
son shall be absolutely void without any decree of divorce or other legal process." Loving,
388 U.S. at 4 n.3 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-57 (Michie 1960) (repealed 1968)). The
statute defined white person as "such person as has no trace whatever of any blood other
than Caucasian; but persons who have one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American
Indian and have no other non-Caucasic blood shall be deemed to be white persons." Id.
(quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 (Michie 1960) (repealed 1968)).
At the time of the Loving litigation, sixteen states, including Virginia, had laws prohibit-
ing and punishing interracial marriages: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 n.5. Fourteen states already
had repealed laws banning interracial marriages: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Indiana, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota,
Utah, and Wyoming. Id.
79. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. Relying on earlier decisions involving federal statutes, the
Court noted that "this Court has consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between citizens
solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality."' Id. (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100). Refer-
ring to the standard of review of such distinctions, the Court held that "the Equal Protec-
tion Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be
subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny."' Id. (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216). The
Adarand's Effect on Affirmative Action
Subsequently, in a series of decisions arising under the Fifth Amend-
ment, the Court clearly articulated that the federal government's obliga-
tion to uphold equal protection rights, including racial, gender, and ethnic
equality, cannot be distinguished from that of the states.8" In Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld,81 the Court found that a federal gender-based distinction in
social security benefits violated equal protection rights guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.82 While acknowledging
that there is no Equal Protection Clause in the Fifth Amendment, the
Court justified its analysis based on the proposition that equal protection
claims arising under the Fifth Amendment have been "precisely the
same" as like claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment. 83 Simi-
larly, in Buckley v. Valeo,8 the Court explicitly stated that "[e]qual pro-
tection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under
the Fourteenth Amendment."8" Thus, the Court has foreclosed any at-
tempt to deny the existence of an equal protection guarantee under the
Fifth Amendment.
C. Judicial Analysis of Facially Discriminatory Race-Based Laws
1. Invidious Racial Discrimination
Throughout the struggle to identify a Fifth Amendment equal protec-
tion guarantee, the Court developed a framework for analyzing allegedly
race-based discriminatory legislation enacted by both the federal and
Court recognized that the State has the power to regulate marriages, but rejected Virginia's
argument that the statute was valid because it applied equally to whites and blacks. Id. at
7-8. Because the statute solely prohibited interracial marriages involving whites, but not
other races, the Court found that the statute's underlying purpose of maintaining "White
Supremacy" violated equal protection, Id. at 11-12. The statute also violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by infringing the fundamental right to free-
dom of choice in marriage. Id. at 12.
80. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975) (concluding that a
social security benefits provision utilizing a gender-based distinction violated the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975) (hold-
ing that the Navy's mandatory discharge statute, which treated women differently than
men, did not violate equal protection under the Fifth Amendment); Jimenez v. Wein-
berger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974) (finding a federal law that classified persons based on
illegitimacy violated the guarantees of equal protection implicit in the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause).
81. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
82. Id. at 653.
83. Id. at 638 n.2.
84. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). Certain federal officeholders and candidates chal-
lenged the Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971 on several constitutional grounds, in-
cluding an alleged equal protection violation resulting from purported discrimination
against new parties seeking to run for federal office. Id. at 6-8, 11.
85. Id. at 93.
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state governments.86 Currently labeled the "strict scrutiny" standard,87
the Court utilizes this high level of scrutiny for statutory race-based dis-
tinctions because such distinctions are naturally "odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality., 88
The "strict scrutiny" standard involves a specific methodology refined
by the Supreme Court.89 Although the Court previously had applied
what often amounted to a strict scrutiny analysis, it clearly articulated the
86. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (calling for "the most
rigid scrutiny" of racial classifications). The Court utilizes a stringent standard of review
when analyzing facially discriminatory statutes. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967) (voiding a state statute that discriminated against blacks in marriage); McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (adjudging a Florida penal statute using "rigid scru-
tiny"). The Court also invalidates statutes that are neutral on their face, but that unconsti-
tutionally discriminate in effect. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960)
(finding that Tuskegee, Alabama's municipal boundaries were redrawn to exclude blacks
from voting districts); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939) (holding that an Oklahoma
statute governing voter registration was unduly burdensome on blacks); Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (dismissing as arbitrary and discriminatory a municipal ordi-
nance that prevented Chinese people from operating laundries in San Francisco). In Yick
Wo, the city of San Francisco passed an ordinance requiring all persons owning laundries in
wooden buildings to obtain a permit from the board of supervisors. Id. at 358. The board
denied permits to more than 200 Chinese people operating laundries in wood buildings,
but granted permits to 80 non-Chinese owners of wooden laundries. Id. at 374. The Court
found that the facts clearly established discrimination in administration of the law:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons
in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the Constitution.
Id. at 373-74. But see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (concluding that evi-
dence of a law's disparate impact on one race, by itself, is not enough to support a finding
of unlawful discrimination).
87., See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112-13 (1995) (calling for
strict scrutiny review of federal affirmative action programs); see also supra note 15 and
accompanying text (describing the strict scrutiny test).
88. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). Justice O'Connor explained
the importance of strictly scrutinizing governmental racial classifications:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based meas-
ures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are "benign" or
"remedial" and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of
racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is
to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The
test also ensures that the means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that
there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate
racial prejudice or stereotype.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
89. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (mandating strict scrutiny review of all governmen-
tal use of racial classifications by requiring that such classifications be "narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests"); see also supra note 15 and ac-
companying text (discussing the strict scrutiny test).
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strict scrutiny standard in Palmore v. Sidoti,9° requiring governmentally-
imposed racial classifications to be "necessary... to the accomplishment"
of a compelling purpose.91 Until the 1970s, courts applied this standard
when determining the validity of any statutorily imposed racial classifica-
tions governed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. 92
2. Benign Racial Discrimination
a. State and Local Governments
Just as the Supreme Court has analyzed the constitutionality of govern-
mental racial classifications that restrict individual rights, the Court also
has scrutinized state-imposed racial classifications aimed at benefitting in-
dividuals of a particular race. 93 In Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke,94 the Court for the first time95 attempted to determine the ap-
90. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
91. Id. at 432-33 (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)).
92. In the early 1970s, the Court began to entertain claims of Title VII employment
violations. Janoff, supra note 5, at 1017. The Court allowed employers to utilize racial
preferences to further Title VII's purpose of increasing employment opportunities for
minorities. Id. at 1019. Thereafter, public and private employers began to implement af-
firmative action programs that were subsequently challenged in the courts. See, e.g.,
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 577 (1984) (invalidating an af-
firmative action layoff plan that dismantled a traditional seniority system, because it un-
duly burdened whites in violation of Title VII); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979) (upholding an employer/union plan that reserved 50% of the
available positions in a training program for minorities).
93. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 469 (affirmative action in construction contracting);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion) (affirmative action
in employment); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (affirmative
action in education).
94. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Bakke produced a variety of opinions. Justice Powell au-
thored an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court. Id. at 267. Justice White joined
in Parts 1, Ill-A, and V-C. Id. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in Parts I
and V-C. Id. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in the judgment
in part, and dissented in part. Id. at 267-68. Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun each
filed separate opinions. Id. at 268. Finally, Justice Stevens joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part. Id.
95. The issue actually arose a few years before Bakke, in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312 (1974), in which the Supreme Court faced its first equal protection challenge to an
affirmative action program. Id. at 314. In that case, the petitioner, a white male, sued the
University of Washington Law School for giving preferential treatment to minorities in the
admissions process. Id. The Supreme Court did not address the standard of review issue,
however, because an earlier court order granting the petitioner's admission to the school
rendered the question moot. Id. at 319-20.
Following the DeFunis decision, opponents of affirmative action first began to express
concern about the phenomenon of "reverse discrimination." W.H. Knight & Adrien Wing,
Weep Not, Little Ones: An Essay to Our Children About Affirmative Action, reprinted in
AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 218 (John H. Franklin & Genna R.
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propriate level of scrutiny for benign race-based classifications.96 Justice
Powell argued for strict scrutiny based on the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 7 and the past use of the Equal Protection Clause as a pro-
tection for all races, not just the "Negro minority. 9 8
Justice Brennan and three other Justices argued for the application of
less stringent standard of review when the burdened individual is not a
member of a suspect class. 99 While they recognized the importance of
McNeil eds., 1995); see also Charles Fried, Forward: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13,
46 (1995) (discussing the advent of the subject of reverse discrimination). Judge Fried
defines reverse discrimination as "explicit, firm racial preferences benefiting historically
disadvantaged groups and especially the descendants of those whose oppression it was a
principal purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to reverse." Id.
96. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287-88 (opinion of Powell, J.). Allan Bakke challenged the
University of California at Davis's Medical School admissions policy, which granted special
treatment to certain minority applicants, including Blacks, Chicanos, Asians, and Ameri-
can Indians, with the aim of diversifying the student population. Id. at 272-74. The minor-
ity student applications were evaluated by a special admissions committee and were
treated like "regular" applications, except that minority applicants did not have to meet
the 2.5 grade point average required of other applicants. Id. at 275. Sixteen seats in the
entering class were reserved for the best minority applicants. Id. The school twice refused
Bakke admission, while admitting minority students who were arguably less qualified than
Bakke. Id. at 276-77. Bakke subsequently filed suit in the Superior Court of California
seeking an injunction to compel his admission. Id. at 277. The trial court held the admis-
sions program unconstitutional, but refused to order Bakke's admission. Id. at 279. Bakke
appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 279-81.
97. Id. at 291 (arguing that racial distinctions are "inherently suspect" and demand
"the most exacting judicial examination"). Justice Powell noted that although the Four-
teenth Amendment originally was enacted to secure equality for the newly emancipated
slaves, the drafters framed the language of the amendment in "universal terms" to ensure
equality for all persons. Id. at 292-93.
98. Id. at 292-95. Justice Powell cited several equal protection claims brought by
members of ethnic groups other than African-Americans. Id. at 292 (citing Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (Mexican-Americans); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (Aus-
trian resident aliens); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (Chinese); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303 (1880) (Celtic Irishmen) (dictum)). Indeed, the Four-
teenth Amendment protects all races, including whites. See supra note 3 (examining the
broad terminology of the Fourteenth Amendment).
In applying the strict scrutiny test, Justice Powell found that the University's desire to
attain greater diversity through the affirmative action plan was "clearly ... a constitution-
ally permissible goal" for an institution of higher learning. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
Thus, the goal satisfied the compelling interest prong of the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 314-
15.
Because the program reserved sixteen seats for minorities, however, it prevented non-
minority individuals from competing for those seats solely because of race. Id. at 319-20.
In addition, because the program focused solely on race, it hindered rather than furthered
the attainment of "genuine" diversity. Id. at 315. Thus, the program was not narrowly
tailored to furthering the valid goal of diversity, thereby infringing an applicant's Four-
teenth Amendment rights. Id. at 320. A better program would involve the "competitive
consideration of race and ethnic origin" as one factor in the admissions process. Id.
99. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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remedial legislation, these Justices noted that attempts to alleviate the
effects of past discrimination through benign statutory classifications may
exacerbate the harm.1"' To balance these competing interests, the Jus-
tices argued for the use of a heightened standard of review resembling
intermediate scrutiny.1 1
Justice Stevens, joined by three other Justices, concurred in the judg-
ment, but asserted that the result should have bean statutorily based."0 2
The variety of opinions in Bakke left the applicable standard of review
for benign governmental classifications largely unresolved.' 3
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,"°4 the Court again faced a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge involving benign ra-
cial classifications.'0 5 A majority of the Court held the provision inva-
lid.106 As in Bakke, Justice Powell argued for strict scrutiny analysis,
noting that the "reasonableness" standard applied by the court of appeals
100. Id. at 360-61. The Justices warned of the stigma that may result from governmen-
tal attempts to remedy past racial discrimination. Id. at 360. Such preferential actions
would reinforce the views of those individuals who already believe that racial minorities
cannot succeed on their own. Id. This negative effect is often cited by those opposing
affirmative action programs. See supra note 22 (discussing the arguments for and against
affirmative action programs).
101. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359. According to these four Justices, benign racial classifica-
tions "'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."' Id. (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
102. Id. at 411-12 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Stevens argued that section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994), prohibited the University of California from excluding any indi-
vidual from its medical school program based on race because the University received
federal financial aid. Id. at 412. Accordingly, the Justices asserted that the statutory viola-
tion justified the Court's judgment. Id.
103. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2108 (1995) (discussing
the Bakke opinions).
104. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion). Justice Powell announced the judgment of
the Court and authored an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.
Id. at 268. Justice O'Connor also joined in this opinion except for Part IV. Id. Justice
O'Connor filed a separate opinion concurring in part and in the judgment. Id. Justice
White filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting
opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun. Id. Finally, Justice Stevens authored a
separate dissenting opinion. Id.
105. Id. at 269-70 (opinion of Powell, J.). In this case, non-minority teachers challenged
a Michigan school board's decision to grant minority teachers preferential treatment dur-
ing layoffs. Id. at 270-72.
106. Id. at 284 (opinion of Powell, J.), 295 (opinion of White, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). Justice Powell found that the school district's goal of alleviating societal discrimina-
tion, by granting preferential treatment in layoffs to minority teachers, was not a
compelling purpose because it was "too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified
remedy." Id. at 276 (opinion of Powell, J.). Note that this purpose was more remedial in
nature than the achievement of diversity purpose in Bakke. See supra note 98 (describing
the University of California's goal of diversity).
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had no merit."°7 Applying strict scrutiny, Justice Powell found that gen-
eral "societal discrimination" could not justify governmental racial dis-
tinctions; rather, the government had to make a specific showing of prior
discrimination.10 8 Justice O'Connor concurred in part and in the judg-
ment, agreeing to the need for a high level of scrutiny in examining be-
nign racial classifications. 1 9 Justice O'Connor noted, however, the
difficulties inherent in a means-ends analysis." 0 Dissenting, Justice Mar-
shall argued that the school board's racial classification survived judicial
scrutiny."'
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,"' the Court examined a chal-
107. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 279 (opinion of Powell, J.). The Sixth Circuit relied on the
district court's reasoning that the school board's goals of providing minority role model
teachers to ameliorate past societal discrimination was important enough to justify the util-
ization of racial criteria in the layoff policy. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152,
1156-57 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
108. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (opinion of Powell, J.). Justice Powell determined that the
discrepancy between the percentage of minority students and the percentage of minority
teachers could be explained by numerous factors unrelated to discrimination. Id. at 276.
Remedies based on such evidence of "societal discrimination" are "over-expansive." Id.
This view coincides with Justice Powell's previous opinion in Bakke, where he rejected
the University of California's goal of remedying the effects of societal discrimination. Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-09 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). He
stated, "We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of
relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of
judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations." Id.
at 307.
109. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 285-86 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
Justice O'Connor noted that the challenging non-minority teachers had the burden of
proof'to show that the layoff policy was not "narrowly tailored." Id. at 294. In her opin-
ion, the teachers met their burden by demonstrating that the government's purpose was
linked to a hiring goal that had no relation to eliminating discrimination in the work place.
Id.
110. Id. at 287. The Justices disagreed in their determination of how well the affirma-
tive action program achieved the constitutional goal of eliminating identified discrimina-
tion. Id.
111. Id. at 302-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall rooted his dissent in the
"longstanding goal of civil rights reform," namely, to eliminate segregation and to integrate
public schools. Id. at 305. He argued that the school board's policy attempted to do just
that. Id.
In scrutinizing the goal of the layoff plan, Justice Marshall argued that the case should be
remanded in light of the extrinsic evidence supporting the school board's need for the
affirmative action plan. Id. at 306. He further asserted that this evidence would establish a
valid purpose. Id. Justice Marshall also found that the plan attained its goal in the least
burdensome manner. Id. at 310. He noted that no member of the Court, himself included,
could suggest a more narrowly tailored program. Id.
112. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices White, Stevens, and Kennedy, authored the opinion of the Court and announced the
judgment of the Court in Parts I, Ill-B, and IV. Id. at 475. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice White joined in Part II of Justice O'Connor's opinion. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White and Stevens joined in Part III-A and V of Justice O'Connor's opinion.
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lenge to a municipal minority business set-aside program.' 13 For the first
time, a majority of the Supreme Court determined that strict scrutiny re-
view should govern all benign uses of racial classifications by state and
local governments. 114 Agreeing with Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke,
Justice O'Connor noted the importance of preventing the "stigmatic
Id. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and in the judgment. Id. Justice
Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and in the judgment. Id. Justice Scalia filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. Justice Marshall authored a dissenting opinion
joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun. Id. Finally, Justice Blackmun filed a dissent
joined by Justice Brennan. Id.
113. Id. at 477. J.A. Croson Co. (Croson), a plumbing and heating contractor, chal-
lenged the city of Richmond's affirmative action program, which required prime contrac-
tors working on city contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the contract's total
amount to at least one Minority Business Enterprise (MBE). Id. The Richmond Minority
Business Utilization Plan defined a MBE as "[a] business at least fifty-one (51) percent of
which is owned and controlled ... by minority group members." Id. at 478 (quoting RICH-
MOND, VA CITY CODE § 12-23 (1985) [hereinafter CIrY CODE]). The plan further defined
"minority group members" as "[c]itizens of the United States who are Blacks, Spanish-
speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts." Id. (quoting CITY CODE § 12-23). The
declared purpose was to promote "wider participation by minority business enterprises in
the construction of public projects." Id. (quoting CITY CODE § 12-158(a)).
Croson decided to bid as the prime contractor to install plumbing fixtures in a city jail.
Id. at 481-82. He contacted several registered MBEs to serve as supplier of the fixtures,
and eventually discovered that Continental Metal Hose (Continental) was willing to sub-
mit a bid. Id. at 482. Continental had difficulty obtaining a credit check by the city's
deadline, however, and failed to submit a bid to Croson. Id. Consequently, Croson submit-
ted the bid including itself as supplier and applied for a waiver of the MBE requirement.
Id. The waiver form explained that Continental was not qualified, and that the other
MBEs did not respond. Id. Continental eventually submitted its own bid to the city, rais-
ing the total price of Croson's bid by $7,663.16. Id. at 482-83. The city denied Croson's
waiver request, as well as his subsequent request to raise the prime contract price by the
amount of the difference. Id. The city then indicated its decision to reopen the bidding,
and Croson requested a review of the waiver denial. Id.
The city refused to review its decision, leaving Croson no option to appeal. Id. Croson
subsequently filed suit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
alleging the unconstitutionality of the ordinance on its face and as applied. Id. Both the
district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the
ordinance. Id. at 483-84.
On its first review of the case, the Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's decision,
and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the intervening decision in Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion). Id. at 485. The Fourth Cir-
cuit found that the minority set-aside plan failed both prongs of the strict scrutiny test; the
city appealed, and the Supreme Court again granted certiorari. Id. at 485-86.
114. Id. at 493 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). Justice O'Connor announced the strict scru-
tiny mandate in part III-A of the opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White,
and Justice Kennedy joined. Id. at 493-98. Justice Scalia concurred in judgment, and in the
conclusion that strict scrutiny should apply. Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(stating that, "I agree with much of the Court's opinion, and, in particular, with Justice
O'Connor's conclusion that strict scrutiny must be applied to all governmental classifica-
tion by race, whether or not its asserted purpose is 'remedial' or 'benign."'). Thus, a major-
ity of the Court held that strict scrutiny is the proper standard to apply to state or local
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harm" that may result from the government's improper use of remedial
racial classifications.115 Additionally, she agreed that the standard of re-
view should not depend on the race of those burdened by the
classification. 11 6
The Court then discussed the factual findings needed to survive the
first prong of strict scrutiny review.117 Quoting Justice Powell, Justice
O'Connor reasserted the proposition that justifying a remedial racial clas-
sification by presenting a general history of discrimination is not suffi-
cient, because such justifications are "ageless in their reach into the past,
and timeless in their ability to affect the future." '118 The Court found in-
sufficient the evidence offered to support the Richmond plan, including a
generalized assertion of racial discrimination in that region's construction
industry.119 The Court also found it nearly impossible to determine
whether the set-aside program was "narrowly tailored" because there was
no compelling interest.120 Thus, Justice O'Connor asserted that the Rich-
governmental race-based classifications. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097, 2110 (1995).
115. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). Justice O'Connor quoted Jus-
tice Powell's proposition that "'preferential programs may only reinforce common stereo-
types holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection
based on a factor having no relation to individual worth."' Id. at 494 (quoting Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
116. Id. at 494. "The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when ap-
plied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color." Id.
(quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90 (opinion of Powell, J.)).
117. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,498-500 (1989). The purported
purpose of the Richmond plan was remedial in nature, aimed at alleviating the current
effects of past discrimination in the construction industry. Id. at 498. The factual findings
presented by the city, however, failed to necessitate remedial action. Id. at 500.
118. Id. at 498 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.)); see supra note 108 and accompanying text
(discussing the rejection of prior societal discrimination as a compelling purpose).
119. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500. Additional findings also failed to satisfy the Court's re-
quirement of specific discrimination in the Richmond construction industry. Id. at 500-05.
The Court examined the city's evidence, including: (1) the city's designation of the pro-
gram as remedial, (2) statistical disparities between the size of the minority population in
Richmond and the number of contracts awarded to minorities, (3) data indicating member-
ship of minority contractors in the local contractors' associations was low, and (4) a previ-
ous finding by Congress, relied upon in another case, that discrimination in the
construction industry was prevalent across the nation. Id. at 500-04. The Court found that
these facts failed to highlight identified discrimination in the Richmond construction indus-
try, and were thus inadequate to justify the implementation of the Richmond plan. Id. at
505.
120. Id. at 507. The Court first noted that the city failed to assess any race-neutral
alternatives to increasing minority participation in the construction industry. Id. In deter-
mining whether a race-based program is narrowly tailored, the Court will consider, as one
factor, the availability of alternative non-race-based remedies. Id. (citing United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987)). The Court next found that Richmond's use of a 30%
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mond plan violated the Equal Protection Clause due to the "treatment of
its citizens on a racial basis."' 21
b. Federal Government
Although the Supreme Court settled the issue of the applicable stan-
dard of review for assessing Fourteenth Amendment challenges to benign
racial classifications used by state and local governments, the same issue
remained unresolved with respect to the Fifth Amendment's equal pro-
tection guarantee until one year after Croson.122 The Court first ad-
dressed a Fifth Amendment affirmative action question in Fullilove v.
Klutznick.123 Much like the earlier decision in Bakke, Fullilove produced
no majority opinion from the Court.' 24
In Fullilove, several associations of construction contractors challenged
the Public Works Employment Act of 1977,125 a federal program that
provided additional funds for local public works projects. 26 The pro-
gram conditioned the disbursement of funds on the local government's
agreement to allocate at least ten percent of the grant to minority-owned
businesses. 127 The contractors alleged that this provision violated the
quota was too rigid and not sufficiently tailored to a proper determination of individualized
need for remedial relief. Id. at 508.
121. Id. at 511 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). Justice O'Connor specifically noted, how-
ever, that the Court's holding should not prevent state or local governments from enacting
programs to alleviate specific instances of racial discrimination, or sufficiently identifiable
past discrimination that previously occurred in their jurisdictions. Id. at 509.
122. See Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,552, 564-65 (1990) (determining
that intermediate scrutiny should govern an equal protection claim of racial discrimination
arising under the Fifth Amendment), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
123. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and Powell,
filed an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court. Id. at 452. Justice Powell filed a
concurring opinion. Id. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion
joined by Justice Rehnquist. Id. Justice Stevens filed a dissent. Id.
124. Id. at 453; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269-72, 291
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (producing no majority opinion from the Court, with Justice
Powell announcing the judgment of the Court and arguing for strict scrutiny).
125. Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-369, 90 Stat. 999 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6701 (1976)), amended by Public Works
Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (1977) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 6701-6736 (1994)).
126. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
127. Id. at 453-54. The applicable section provided:
Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no grant shall be
made under this Act for any local public works project unless the applicant gives
satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 per centum of the amount
of each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises. For purposes
of this paragraph, the term "minority business enterprise" means a business at
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equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.128
In reviewing the federal statute, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices
White and Powell, first analyzed the legislative objectives of the minority
business provision, emphasizing the importance of granting a high level of
deference to congressional lawmakers.' 29 He ultimately determined that
the "clear objective" of the program was to ensure that participants did
not perpetuate prior discrimination. 3 ' Chief Justice Burger next applied
a two-part test to decide whether the statute was constitutional. 31
Although expressly refusing to label the analytical formula, he agreed
that racial preferences imposed by the government must be subject to a
"searching examination.' 1 32 Ten years later,' 33 in Metro Broadcasting,
least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority group members or, in case of a
publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which is owned by
minority group members. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, minority
group members are citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speak-
ing, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.
42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2).
128. Fullilove; 448 U.S. at 455.
129. Id. at 456-72. Chief Justice Burger first analyzed the congressional hearings to
determine the purposes of the provision. Id. at 457-63. He found that the original act was
aimed at alleviating the national problem of unemployment and stimulating the national
economy. Id. at 456-57. In 1977, Congress amended the original act, adding the minority
business provision to steer federal funds to minority businesses that purportedly could not
benefit from the original program. Id. at 458-59.
Because Congress is a co-equal branch, Chief Justice Burger articulated an intent to
analyze the propriety of the program "with appropriate deference to the Congress." Id. at
472. The willingness to defer to Congress, even at an "appropriate" level, signalled the use
of a standard less stringent than strict scrutiny. See id. at 473 (describing the use of a test
resembling the intermediate standard of review).
130. Id. Thus, the ultimate purpose was remedial in nature. Id.
131. Id. The first step inquired whether Congress had the power to further the stated
objectives. Id. The second step questioned whether the use of racial classifications was "a
constitutionally permissible means for achieving the congressional objectives." Id.
Chief Justice Burger first found that the Act was a valid exercise of Congress's ability to
"provide for the ... general Welfare" under the Spending Power. Id. at 473-74 (quoting
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1). He next determined that the statute was neither underinclu-
sive nor overinclusive, but was a proper exercise of Congress's broad remedial powers. Id.
at 483-89. Thus, the statute passed the two-part test and did not violate the Constitution.
Id. at 492.
132. Id. at 491. In analyzing the use of racial classifications as a means to achieve the
stated objectives, Chief Justice Burger recognized the need for "careful judicial evaluation"
despite the deference owed to Congress. Id. at 480. He did not, however, label the
method of analysis: "[tihis opinion does not adopt, either expressly or implicitly, the for-
mulas of analysis articulated" in other cases. Id. at 492.
In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Marshall used an intermediate scru-
tiny standard of review to determine the validity of the program at issue. Id. at 519. (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Marshall stated that "the proper inquiry is
whether racial classifications designed to further remedial purposes serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id.
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Inc. v. FCC,3 4 the Supreme Court faced another Fifth Amendment equal
protection challenge. 135 In Metro Broadcasting, the Court reviewed two
minority preference programs instituted by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC). 3 6 The first program permitted the FCC to consider
an applicant's minority ownership when issuing new radio or television
broadcast licenses. 137 The second program involved a "distress sale pol-
icy" whereby a licensee whose license was eligible for renewal or subject
to revocation could assign it to a minority business without an agency
hearing. 138
Upon reviewing the two FCC programs, the Supreme Court again de-
ferred to the legislative branch, applying intermediate rather than strict
Because the use of a 10% minority set-aside provision was substantially related to the
achievement of remedying present effects of prior discrimination, Justice Marshall found
that the program survived judicial scrutiny. Id. at 521. He thus concurred in the judgment.
Id. at 522.
133. During this ten year period, the Court faced two equal protection challenges to
state affirmative action programs. See supra notes 104-21 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the two intervening state affirmative action cases). Following its decision in Fullilove,
however, the Court did not entertain another equal protection challenge to a federal af-
firmative action program until its decision in Metro Broadcasting. See infra notes 134-42
and accompanying text (reviewing Metro Broadcasting).
134. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115
S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
135. Id. at 552.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 556 (citing Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Fa-
cilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979 (1978)). In comparing applications for broadcasting licenses under
this policy, the FCC considered "minority ownership and participation in management"
along with six other factors: "diversification of control of mass media communications, full-
time participation in station operation by owners . . . , proposed program service, past
broadcast record, efficient use of the frequency, and the character of the applicants." Id. at
556-57 (citing Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394-
99 (1965)).
138. Id. at 557 (citing Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority
Ownership in Broadcasting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 851 (1982)). The minority business had to
meet the FCC's basic qualifications, with minority ownership exceeding 50%. Id. Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. (Metro) along with several other applicants, including Rainbow Broad-
casting (Rainbow), submitted an application to operate a television station in Orlando,
Florida. Id. at 558. The FCC Review Board awarded the license to Rainbow largely be-
cause it was 90% Hispanic-owned. Id. at 558-59. Metro subsequently challenged the mi-
nority preferences under the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component. Id. at 552.
The Court consolidated this case with a decision involving Faith Center, Inc. (Faith
Center), a minority licensee of a television station located in Hartford, Connecticut. Id. at
561. Faith Center, scheduled for a hearing on the renewal of its license, twice attempted to
assign its license to another minority business under the "distress sale policy." Id. Mean-
while, a non-minority applicant, Shurberg, also applied for the FCC license. Id. When the
FCC permitted Faith Center to assign the license to the minority business, Shurberg filed
suit. Id. at 562.
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scrutiny review. 139 Notwithstanding its recent holding in Croson, which
called for strict scrutiny review of benign racial classifications created by
state and local governments, 4° the Court justified its decision by distin-
guishing congressional action from state and local legislative action.' 41
Relying on Fullilove, Justice Brennan emphasized the special ability of
139. Id. at 563-65. The Court stated, "[W]e are 'bound to approach our task with ap-
propriate deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch .... ' Id. at 563 (quoting Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.)). The Court emphasized
the importance of "Congress' institutional competence as the National Legislature." Id.
The Court articulated the intermediate scrutiny analysis in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976), a gender discrimination case. See supra note 14 and accompanying text
(describing the intermediate standard of review). Laws surviving intermediate scrutiny
"must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. In Metro Broadcasting, the
Court expressly adopted the intermediate standard of review, stating that the FCC's poli-
cies must serve "important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and
[must be] substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 565 (1990), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
Unlike many of the prior affirmative action policies evaluated by the Court, the purpose
of the FCC's minority preference programs was not explicitly remedial, attempting to alle-
viate the effects of prior discrimination. Id. at 556. Rather, the FCC wanted to increase
diversity in the broadcast industry. Id. Compare Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 566
(describing Congress's selection of preference policies to promote programming diversity)
with Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (discussing
the remedial purpose of the minority business set-aside program). See also Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (finding that
promoting a diverse student body is a permissible goal of a minority preference program).
140. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (discussing the Croson decision).
The Court noted that Croson addressed a benign race-based program adopted by a munici-
pal government, whereas Congress enacted the program at issue here. Metro Broadcast-
ing, 497 U.S. at 565. Thus, the standard of review mandated in Croson did not govern the
FCC programs because they were created by the federal government, not a state or local
government. Id.
141. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 565. Quoting Croson, the Court noted that
"'Congress may identify and redress the effects of society-wide discrimination"' and "'need
not make specific findings of discrimination to engage in race-conscious relief."' Id. (quot-
ing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 489-90 (1989) (opinion of
O'Connor, J.)). Justice Scalia also found: "A sound distinction between federal and state
(or local) action based on race rests not only upon the substance of the Civil War Amend-
ments, but upon social reality and governmental theory." Croson, 488 U.S. at 522 (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment).
Presumably, in Metro Broadcasting, Congress's enhanced ability to address general ra-
cial discrimination justified the Court's application of a less stringent standard of review in
evaluating federal benign race-based legislation. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 565-66.
The Court ultimately sustained the FCC programs under the intermediate scrutiny test,
holding that they did not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 600-01.
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Congress to utilize racial classifications because of its "institutional com-
petence" as a co-equal branch of government. 42
The Court's use of varying standards to analyze equal protection claims
of racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment versus the
Fifth Amendment raised serious questions and provoked critical com-
mentary. 143 The Adarand Court revisited the issue of which standard of
review should apply to benign racial classifications imposed by the fed-
eral government, holding strict scrutiny applicable across the board. 44
142. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563. Indeed, the Fullilove Court distinguished the
program at issue based on its federal derivation, implying the need to afford Congress
greater deference in its use of race-based classifications. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 472 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.). Justice Powell reiterated this idea, emphasizing
that Congress has unique constitutional powers in enforcing the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments. Id. at 500 (Powell, J., concurring); see supra note 4 (discussing
the Civil War Amendments). According to Justice Powell, "Congress properly may-and
indeed must-address directly the problems of discrimination in our society." Fullilove,
448 U.S. at 499 (Powell, J., concurring). In Metro Broadcasting, Justice Brennan also relied
on Croson to justify the notion that Congress should be afforded greater deference when it
creates race-based remedies. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 565-66; see supra note 141
(quoting various passages from Croson that discuss the federal-state distinction).
The Adarand decision largely discredits the federal-state distinction developed in Fulli-
love and Metro Broadcasting by asserting the importance of congruence between federal
and state actions. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2123-26.(1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's refusal to grant Congress greater defer-
ence); see also infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens' criti-
cism of the Adarand majority's notion of congruence).
143. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Comment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a
Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REv. 125, 129 (1990) (asserting that strict scrutiny is the appropri-
ate standard of review for all governmental racial classifications); Charles Fried, Com-
ment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REV. 107,
113 (1990) (criticizing the Court's use of a relaxed standard of review in Metro Broadcast-
ing); Katz, supra note 10, at 354-55 (advocating the use of intermediate scrutiny review of
all benign classifications); Edward D. Rogers, When Logic and Reality Collide: The
Supreme Court and Minority Business Set-Asides, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 117, 166-
68 (1990) (arguing that the Croson strict scrutiny standard should not apply to review of
congressional affirmative action programs).
In arguing for strict scrutiny review of federal affirmative action programs, Professor
Devins concedes that a federal decision to use racial classifications should receive more
deference than a state or local government decision. Devins, supra, at 146. A lower stan-
dard of review, however, allows greater judicial tolerance of racial classifications than strict
scrutiny. Id. at 147. Indeed, the Metro Broadcasting Court's standard tolerated a racial
classification notwithstanding its infringement on individuals' equal protection rights:
"The notion that first-amendment diversity concerns, in general, outweigh core equal pro-
tection concerns is dumbfounding." Id.
Other commentators argue that because of Congress's greater authority and duty to
make national policies and findings, rather than specific regional findings, applying a lower
standard of scrutiny alleviates separation of powers concerns. Rogers, supra, at 130-31.
Thus, the greater the authority of the legislative body enacting the affirmative action pro-
gram, the less stringent the Court's level of review. Id. at 132-33.
144. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995).
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II. ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. PENA: THE APPLICATION OF
STRICT SCRUTINY TO ALL RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PROGRAMS
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,145 the Petitioner contested the
federal government's ability to utilize monetary incentives to encourage
prime contractors to award subcontracts to disadvantaged businesses. 146
Specifically, Adarand contended that the race-based presumptions used
to determine whether a business is disadvantaged violated the right to
equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. 47 The lower courts dis-
agreed and upheld the program, after reviewing it under an intermediate
standard of review.148 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, di-
recting the lower court to apply strict scrutiny review.' 49
A. Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Skepticism, Consistency,
and Congruence
Evidenced by the number of differing opinions, the Court confronted a
controversial and difficult issue in Adarand.15 ° The majority based its
ultimate decision on "three general propositions with respect to govern-
mental racial classifications."'' The Court began by tracing the history
145. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, announced the judgment of the Court and authored
an opinion with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, III-B, III-D, and IV except insofar as the
opinion was inconsistent with Justice Scalia's views. Id. at 2101. Justice Kennedy joined in
Part III-C of Justice O'Connor's opinion. Id. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas filed sepa-
rate opinions concurring in part and in the judgment. Id. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, filed a dissenting opinion. Id. Justice Souter filed a separate dissent, joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. Id. Finally, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, filed
a dissent. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240, 244-45 (D. Colo.
1992) (granting the federal government's motion for summary judgment upon applying the
Fullilove standard to uphold the constitutionality of the minority set-aside program at is-
sue), aff'd sub nom. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994),
vacated 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537, 1547
(10th Cir. 1994) (affirming the district court's decision to grant the federal government's
motion for summary judgment), vacated 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
149. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118. According to an attorney associated with the case, the
district court heard oral arguments during the summer of 1996.
150. The case resulted in a five to four decision. Id. at 2101; see supra note 145 (setting
forth the various opinions in Adarand).
151. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111.
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of equal protection law, highlighting a jurisprudential commitment to
three propositions: skepticism, consistency, and congruence.152
1. Skepticism
The Court has been long adverse to the notion of racial classifications
imposed by the government. 153 Indeed, in an early decision addressing
federal racial classifications, the Court recognized that "racial discrimina-
tions are in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited."' 54
One year later, the notion of viewing racial distinctions with skepticism
again was articulated in Korematsu v. United States.' 55 Justice Black's
opinion, asserting that racial classifications are "immediately suspect"
and, therefore, subject to "the most rigid scrutiny," has been relied upon
by the Court in subsequent cases involving racial distinctions imple-
mented by government actors.156 The majority in Adarand acknowl-
edged and affirmed these illustrations of the Court's historical skepticism
towards racial classifications.1 57
2. Consistency
The Adarand majority defined consistency as the idea that all racial
classifications imposed by the government demand the same standard of
review, regardless of the motive underlying the classification. 158 Because
it may be difficult to determine when a classification is benign, the Court
152. Id. at 2106-12; see also infra notes 153-66 and accompanying text (discussing these
three propositions).
153. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (commenting that dis-
tinctions based on ancestry are contrary to equality, and therefore, governmental race-
based classifications have been found to violate equal protection); see also Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (noting outright that restrictions based on race
should be immediately questioned).
154. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100.
155. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
156. Id.; see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (advocating the use of a height-
ened standard of review of governmental racial classifications). The Boiling Court reiter-
ated that "classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care,
since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect." Id. (citing
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (finding that
criminal statutes employing racial classifications are "especially suspect"); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (quoting Boiling for the proposition that racial classifica-
tions are "constitutionally suspect").
157. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111.
158. Id.; see, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,494 (1989) (opin-
ion of O'Connor, J.); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1980) (opinion
of Powell, J.); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.).
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called for strict scrutiny review of all classifications. 159 The majority re-
lied on language from Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, which espoused
the need for equity in enforcing equal protection of the laws. 160 Justice
Powell asserted that, "[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean
one thing when applied to one individual and something else when ap-
plied to a person of another color.' 16 1 Similarly, Justice O'Connor relied
on the opinion in Croson to show that an individual's equal protection
rights do not depend on race. 162
3. Congruence
Finally, the Adarand majority advocated the necessity of analyzing
equal protection claims under the Fifth Amendment in the same manner
as those claims governed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 63 Throughout
its analysis of the development of equal protection law, the majority high-
lighted the Court's continued commitment to identical review of these
claims under the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. 64  Justice
O'Connor quoted Buckley v. Valeo 65 to illustrate the Court's under-
159. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112-13. For this reason, strict scrutiny requires more than
the mere recitation, by the government, of a proper motive for the use of a racial classifica-
tion. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (rejecting the city's designation of the set-aside plan as
remedial). The Court in Croson emphasized that racial classifications are suspect. Id.
Thus, "simple legislative assurances of good intention cannot suffice." Id.; see infra note
222 (discussing the difficulty in distinguishing between benign and malevolent motives).
160. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2108; see supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Justice Powell's assertion in Bakke that the Equal Protection Clause applies to all indi-
viduals, regardless of race).
161. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90 (opinion of Powell, J.). In Bakke, Justice Powell contin-
ued, "If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal." Id. at 290. He
also added, "Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call
for the most exacting judicial examination." Id. at 291. Finally, he quoted language from
an earlier race discrimination case: "The guarantees of equal protection . . . 'are universal
in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a
pledge of the protection of equal laws."' Id. at 292-93 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
162. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111. Justice O'Connor authored the opinion in Croson,
finding that "the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent
on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification." Croson, 488 U.S.
at 494 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
163. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111.
164. Id. at 2106-09. For example, the Court quoted a passage from McLaughlin v. Flor-
ida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964), a case involving a challenge to a Florida race-based law.
Id. at 2107. The majority noted that the McLaughlin Court's reliance on case holdings
involving federal statutes to support its decision in a case involving a state statute implied
that the standards for state and federal racial classifications were the same. Id.
165. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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standing that "[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is
the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 166
B. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Overruled
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,6 7 the Court applied intermediate,
rather than strict scrutiny, to the two race-based programs instituted by
the FCC.1 68 The Court justified its decision based on a duty to accord a
high level of deference to Congress as the "National Legislature.' 69 To
support this concept, the Court reiterated the premise of Fullilove v.
Klutznick, which acknowledged Congress's broad powers under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment 170 to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause through the use of benign racial classifications. 171 Justice Bren-
nan, writing for the majority, noted that although strict scrutiny review
was warranted for state and local governmental affirmative action pro-
grams, it was not applicable here because the FCC was a federal
agency.172
The Adarand majority criticized the Court's decision in Metro Broad-
casting as disrupting the three propositions underlying prior equal protec-
tion jurisprudence. 73 First, the Metro Broadcasting decision upset the
congruence existing between the equal protection standards applicable to
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims by imposing a less stringent
standard of review on the federal government's use of benign racial clas-
sifications.' 74 This, in turn, frustrated the importance of viewing racial
classifications skeptically, by granting some governmental racial classifi-
cations greater leeway than others.'75 Finally, the holding in Metro
Broadcasting undermined the principle of consistency by making the race
166. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 93).
167. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115
S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
168. Id. at 564-65; see supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text for a more detailed
discussion of Metro Broadcasting.
169. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563.
170. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5; see supra note 1 (providing the text of Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
171. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65.
172. Id. at 565. Justice Brennan found that much of the justification for imposing strict
scrutiny review of state and local affirmative action programs in Croson relied on a distinc-
tion between the lesser ability of state and local governments to address racial discrimina-
tion versus Congress's heightened ability to do so. Id. at 565-66.
173. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112; see supra notes 153-66 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing in detail the three propositions: skepticism, consistency, and congruence).
174. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111-12.
175. Id. at 2112. Some racial classifications imposed by the government were no longer
"inherently suspect," as previously espoused by the Court. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 523 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that according to the Constitution, all
19961
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of the group benefitting from the classification determinative of the appli-
cable standard of review. 176 To ensure the continued adherence to the
three propositions underlying equal protection jurisprudence, the
Adarand majority ordered strict scrutiny review of all racial classifica-
tions, overruling Metro Broadcasting to the extent that it called for inter-
mediate scrutiny review of benign federal governmental race-based
classifications. 177
C. Stare Decisis
Because the Adarand Court rejected two of its earlier rulings, 178 Jus-
tice O'Connor, joined only by Justice Kennedy, justified the departure
from precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis.179 She noted that the
Court may reject a prior ruling when that ruling undermines a doctrine
embedded in prior law.180 In support, Justice O'Connor cited several
analogous cases in which the Supreme Court justifiably had overruled
previous decisions. 8' Because Metro Broadcasting itself was a recent de-
parture from "the fabric of the law," reliance on its holding presumably
government actions that treat individuals differently because of race or ethnicity are
suspect).
176. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112.
177. Id. at 2113. The majority asserted that the use of strict scrutiny is "essential" to
ensuring that a benign racial classification is-indeed "benign" and not an illegitimate use of
race. Id. at 2112 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(opinion of O'Connor, J.). A lesser standard of scrutiny does not protect against this dan-
ger. Id.
178. Id. at 2113,2117. The Court explicitly overruled its holding in Metro Broadcasting,
which subjected federal affirmative action programs to a standard less than strict scrutiny.
Id. at 2113. Further, Adarand clarified that "to the extent (if any) that Fullilove held fed-
eral racial classifications to be subject to a less rigorous standard, it is no longer control-
ling." Id. at 2117.
179. Id. at 2114-17 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). Black's Law Dictionary defines stare
decisis as "[t]o abide by, or adhere to, decided cases." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406
(6th ed. 1990); see also Devins, supra note 143, at 156 (questioning the precedential value
of Metro Broadcasting).
180. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114-15. Justice O'Connor heeded Justice Frankfurter's
warning in an earlier case that "'stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical
formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such
adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically
sounder, and verified by experience."' Id. (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119
(1940)). Metro Broadcasting created a distinction between standards of review of federal
and state racial classifications that undermined the doctrine of equal protection, including
the three principles of skepticism, consistency, and congruence, established over the past
five decades. Id. at 2115.
181. Id. at 2115-16. For example, the Court's decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) overruled the holding of United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) because Arnold was an "abrupt and largely unexplained depar-
ture" from precedent. Adarand, 115 S. Ct at 2115 (quoting Continental TV., 433 U.S. at
47-48).
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was minimal, having little impact on primary conduct. 82 Thus, the
Adarand decision did not depart from prior law, it restored it. 183
D. The Concurrences
Justice Scalia issued a brief concurrence expressing his view that reme-
dying the effects of past discrimination can never be a compelling govern-
ment interest.184 He cited various constitutional provisions aimed at
rejecting racial distinctions. 185 Finally, he contended that the affirmative
action program at issue would not survive strict scrutiny review on
remand. 86
Justice Thomas filed a separate concurrence, indicating his agreement
with the majority's decision to demand strict scrutiny review of all gov-
ernmental classifications based on race. 87 He also expressed his impas-
sioned views on the danger of awarding preferential treatment to certain
classes of people based on race; this, he argued, results in "racial pater-
nalism."' 88 Justice Thomas concluded that governmental discrimination
is unacceptable for any reason. 189
182. Id. at 2116. To illustrate, Justice O'Connor cited a recent case in which the Court
refused to overrule its holding in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), because
"private parties ha[d] likely written contracts relying upon Southland as authority." Id.
(citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 838-39 (1995)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). Justice Scalia ar-
gued that "under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a
debtor race." Id. Justice Scalia did not join in part III-C of the decision, in which Justice
O'Connor provided the rationale for failing to adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis. Id.
185. Id. at 2118-19. Justice Scalia quoted the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth
Amendment, Article III, § 3, and Article 1, § 9 to illustrate the Constitution's rejection of
racial classifications. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (providing that "no Attainder of
Treason shall work Corruption of Blood"); U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9 ("No Title of Nobility
shall be granted by the United States"). According to Justice Scalia, "In the eyes of gov-
ernment, we are just one race here. It is American." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119.
186. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119.
187. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). Justice Thomas wrote
separately to express his disagreement with the "racial paternalism exception to the princi-
ple of equal protection" espoused in Justice Stevens's and Justice Ginsburg's dissents. Id.
188. Id. Justice Thomas warned that so-called benign racial preferences erode the self-
worth of minorities and provoke resentment among the majority. Id. Additionally, gov-
ernment affirmative action programs may cause minorities to become dependent on assist-
ance or feel "entitled" to preferences. Id. These views are commonly asserted by those
opposing affirmative action programs. See supra note 22 (describing the harmful effects of
affirmative action programs, such as the stigma imposed on recipients of affirmative action
preferences).
189. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119.
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E. The Dissents
In a lengthy dissenting opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Ste-
vens vehemently criticized the majority's interpretation of equal protec-
tion values. 190 He first commented on the Court's notion of skepticism,
agreeing that courts "should be wary" of racial classifications imple-
mented by the government. 191 He then attacked the notions of consis-
tency and congruence, arguing that the majority ignored well-settled law
governing affirmative action.' 92
According to Justice Stevens, a significant difference exists between the
government's decision to burden the minority, and its decision to benefit
the minority while incidentally burdening the majority.' 93 The former re-
sults in oppression, while the latter fosters equality in society. 94 Justice
Stevens also challenged the majority's assertion that it is difficult to dis-
tinguish between benign and invidious classifications. 195 Because affirm-
ative action is "common and well understood," he argued that it is easy to
distinguish good intentions from bad.' 96 For this reason, affirmative ac-
tion laws that impose incidental burdens on the majority while providing
benefits to the disadvantaged minority need not be subject to the same
strict standard of review. 197
Similarly, Justice Stevens criticized the majority's notion of congruence
as rejecting the "practical and legal differences" between federal and
state government actions.' 98 He noted that the opinions in Metro Broad-
190. Id. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2126. Justice Stevens rejected Justice O'Connor's explanation justifying a
departure from the concept of stare decisis. Id. at 2127. He noted that only Justice Ken-
nedy joined in this explanation, while the other members of the majority provided no ex-
planation for their decision to overrule precedent in this area. Id. at 2127 n.12; see supra
notes 179-83 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's justification for its depar-
ture from precedent).
193. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120. In other words, benign racial classifications imposed
by the government should be treated differently than invidious racial classifications be-
cause the underlying motive of each is distinct. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2121-22.
196. Id. at 2121.
197. Id. at 2122-23. Justice Stevens acknowledged that applying the same standard to
"fundamentally different situations" is justified where that single standard can account for
the differences. Id. at 2122. He limited his acquiescence to the majority's decision, how-
ever, noting that "a single standard that purports to equate remedial preferences with in-
vidious discrimination cannot be defended in the name of 'equal protection."' Id.
198. Id. at 2123. According to Justice Stevens, rooted in precedent in this instance is
the notion that Congress is entitled to far greater deference in enacting affirmative action
programs because of its "institutional competence and constitutional authority." Id. at
2125.
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casting and Fullilove, as well as the opinions in Croson authored by Jus-
tice Scalia and Justice O'Connor, relied upon this distinction. 199
Additionally, federal affirmative action programs should receive greater
deference because federal programs represent the "will of our entire Na-
tion's elected representatives," whereas state and local programs may im-
pose burdens on those non-residents powerless to participate in the
decision to enact the program.20 ' Congress's enforcement powers, enu-
merated in Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, entitle it to "far
greater deference" when enacting affirmative action programs.20' Justice
Stevens, therefore, concluded that the majority's notion of congruence
conflicted with well-established principles of equal protection prece-
dent.212 Finally, he found the minority set-aside program at issue valid,
arguing that it was a "carefully crafted program" that passed judicial
scrutiny.20 3
Justice Souter also dissented, joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg,
indicating his hesitancy to address the standard of review question due to
199. Id. at 2124-25. In Croson, Justice Scalia explained that a "sound distinction be-
tween federal and state (or local) action based on race rests not only upon the substance of
the Civil War Amendments, but upon social reality and governmental theory." City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 522 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). Justice O'Connor similarly asserted that, "The Civil War Amendments themselves
worked a dramatic change in the balance between congressional and state power over mat-
ters of race." Id. at 490 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
200. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2125 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This problem arises at the
local level because individuals who are ineligible to vote for legislators who enact affirma-
tive action programs nevertheless may be affected by the programs. Id.
201. Id. at 2126; see supra notes 141-42 (discussing the Metro Broadcasting Court's reli-
ance on the greater deference owed Congress to justify the use of intermediate scrutiny).
202. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2126-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that
Metro Broadcasting and Fullilove both justified the application of a lower standard of re-
view to federal remedial programs based on the greater level of deference accorded Con-
gress. Id. Additionally, in Croson, the Court justified its imposition of a stricter standard
of review on state and local governments using the "federal-state" distinction. Id. at 2127.
According to Justice Stevens, the Adarand majority erroneously ignored this firm dichot-
omy in order to promote the notion of congruence. Id.
203. Id. at 2128-30. Justice Stevens compared the STURAA preference program to the
program upheld in Fullilove, finding the current program no more "objectionable." Id. at
2128. He noted that the current program, unlike the one involved in Fullilove, did not
make race the sole criterion for the benefits, but established a rebuttable presumption of
disadvantage based on race. Id. at 2128-29. Also, the STURAA program provided for
periodic review of those receiving the benefits, preventing illegitimate firms from taking
advantage of the program. Id. at 2129-30. Whereas the Fullilove program required that
ten percent of the federal grant go to minorities, the STURAA scheme set no specific
requirements, just goals. Id. at 2130. Finally, Justice Stevens asserted that the extensive
congressional deliberations regarding the minority set-aside program demand that the
Court grant Congress even greater deference than in Fullilove, presumably because the
STURAA program was enacted only after careful consideration. Id.
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stare decisis considerations.2 °4 He emphasized the majority's failure to
address the issue of the high level of deference due Congress under Sec-
tion Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 °5 Finally, he found the tempo-
rary burden imposed on the "historically favored race" reasonable to
eliminate continued discriminatory effects.20 6
In the final dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, focused
on the necessity of affirmative action programs to remedy the continuing
effects of discrimination.20 7 Justice Ginsburg expressed concern that the
strict scrutiny standard may indeed be "fatal" for affirmative action pro-
grams,20 8 but nevertheless defended the need for "close review" of such
programs without specifically labeling this level of review.
209
III. IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY
A. Three Racial Classification Propositions: Are They Valid?
1. Skepticism
The majority's espousal of three propositions underlying governmental
racial classifications derives logically and soundly from the body of equal
protection law developed over the years.210 The first proposition, that
204. Id. at 2131-32 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter agreed with Justice Stevens
that stare decisis required the Court to apply the Fullilove standard in this case. Id. at
2132. He further argued that the set-aside program was constitutional under the Fullilove
test. Id. at 2131.
205. Id. at 2133. The majority opinion briefly defended its decision to apply strict scru-
tiny by asserting that its decision did not "contravene any principle of appropriate respect
for a co-equal Branch of the Government." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114. It acknowledged
the varying views advocated by certain members of the majority in other cases, yet tersely
dismissed these differences: "We need not, and do not, address these differences today."
Id.
206. Id. at 2133-34 (Souter, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 2134-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg cited various social sci-
ence studies illustrating the persistent inconsistencies individuals encounter in employ-
ment, business, and marketplace opportunities because of their race. Id. at 2135 nn.3-5.
For example, studies suggest that job seekers with identical qualifications receive disparate
treatment depending on their race. Id. at 2135 n.3 (citing Harry Cross et al., Employer
Hiring Practices: Differential Treatment of Hispanic and Anglo Job Seekers, URB. INST.
REP. 90-4 42 (1990)); see supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (providing similar
statistics).
208. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
209. Id. While Justice Ginsburg advocated "close review" to "ferret out classifications
in reality malign, but masquerading as benign" and to ensure that "preferences are not so
large as to trammel unduly upon the opportunities of others or interfere too harshly with
legitimate expectations of persons in once-preferred groups," she disagreed with the ma-
jority's use of the term "strict scrutiny." Id.
210. See supra notes 48-144 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the historical
development of equal protection jurisprudence in the realm of governmental race
discrimination).
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courts must view governmentally imposed racial classifications with skep-
ticism, invites little controversy.2 ' Since the first decisions addressing
the government's use of restrictions based on race, the Court has indi-
cated the need to view such restrictions with suspicion.212 Because strict
scrutiny is the most exacting standard of review, it follows that the appli-
cation of strict scrutiny to all racial classifications imposed by the govern-
ment upholds the Court's commitment to viewing governmental racial
classifications with skepticism.
213
2. Consistency
As in previous challenges to racially discriminatory laws, "consistency"
compels courts to question the motives underlying any governmental pro-
gram employing racial classifications, including affirmative action pro-
grams.214 The government's use of race as a classifying factor has been
criticized since the adoption of the Equal Protection Clause.21 5 Until the
early 1970s, the Supreme Court faced challenges solely to invidious gov-
ernmental uses of race.216 Affirmative action, however, by definition
seeks to utilize racial criteria to benefit the minority class.217 Thus, the
211. Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Stevens agreed that the Court's idea of skepticism is
"a good statement of law and of common sense." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
212. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (noting that racial classi-
fications are "immediately suspect"); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)
(declaring that distinctions based on ancestry are "odious to a free people").
213. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (espousing the need for strict scrutiny review to
distinguish the government's legitimate use of race as a classifying factor from an illegiti-
mate one).
214. Because affirmative action programs classify by race in a "benign" manner, such
programs arguably do not require strict judicial review. See id. at 2120-23 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that significant differences in the type of classification justify different
standards of review). The majority, however, refused to accept that the applicable stan-
dard of review should depend on the race of the individual benefited or burdened by a
governmental classification. Id. at 2111.
215. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.) (noting that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to protect the
former slaves from oppression); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303, 306
(1879) (asserting that the framing and adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment resulted
from a desire to "assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights"); see also
supra notes 3-5 (discussing the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment).
216. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (involving a statute expressly
prohibiting interracial marriages); Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305 (involving a statute that al-
lowed only white males to serve on juries). Some statutes, while not expressly utilizing
race as a classification, discriminated against certain races in their effect. See Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (determining that a statute preventing the use of certain
types of buildings as laundries discriminated against the Chinese population); see also
supra note 86 (describing statutes invalidated by the Court due to discriminatory effects).
217. See supra note 10 (defining affirmative action programs).
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government's creation of affirmative action programs presented the
courts with a novel utilization of race as a benign classifying factor. 18
Consistency directs courts to review all racial classifications using the
same standard, regardless of whether the classification burdens the mi-
nority or the majority. 19 To some, consistency ignores the government's
"good" motives and intentions that underlie the use of racial classifica-
tions.2"' Justice Stevens argued that the government's use of benign clas-
sifications should be held to a less stringent standard because this type of
218. The advent of affirmative action programs gave rise to claims of "reverse discrimi-
nation," in which white males claimed they were denied equal opportunities by virtue of
the government's grant of preferential treatment to minorities based on race, gender, or
ethnicity. See supra note 95 (discussing reverse discrimination). For this reason, the
Supreme Court has had considerable difficulty determining the constitutional limits of
these programs, evidenced by its inability, until Adarand, to determine what judicial stan-
dard of review should be used in analyzing affirmative action programs. Compare Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990) (employing an intermediate scrutiny
standard to federal minority preference programs), overruled in part by Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) with City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (demanding strict scrutiny review of state
and local governmental affirmative action programs) and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 473 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (adopting a two-part test to analyze a federal
minority set-aside program).
219. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111. Because consistency calls for treating people of all
races the same, the ever-changing demographics of the United States make this idea in-
creasingly more valid. Those groups once considered minorities are now becoming majori-
ties in certain parts of the country. See Diane Seo, Growing Asian Enrollment Redefines
UC Campuses, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1995, at Al, A10. For instance, the Asian population
in California increased by 1.5 million between 1980 and 1990. Id. at A10. Asians are
considered minorities in California, yet they comprise the largest ethnic group at four Uni-
versity of California campuses: Berkeley, Los Angeles, Irvine and Riverside. Id. Due to
their increasing numbers, many Asians complain that they are denied admission to the
most elite University of California schools, UCLA and Berkeley, while blacks, Latinos,
and Native Americans with lower qualifications are admitted under affirmative action pro-
grams. Id. Thus, the minority/majority categories have become blurred in the University
of California school system, causing the Asian "minority" population in California's under-
graduate system to suffer in the same way that the white "majority" suffers from affirma-
tive action.
220. Motives and intentions are distinct concepts. Strasser, supra note 16, at 341. Moti-
vation provokes an individual to act in a certain manner. Id. Intentions, on the other
hand, are the goals behind the action. Id. Although theoretically distinct, the Supreme
Court has blurred the two concepts in its affirmative action jurisprudence. Id. at 342. Prior
to affirmative action, invidious discrimination largely meant intentional discrimination, re-
gardless of a malevolent motive. Id. Affirmative action, however, involves intentional
classification for benign purposes. See supra note 10 (defining affirmative action pro-
grams). Thus, the Court must decipher the motive behind intentional classifications em-
ployed in affirmative action programs. See Strasser, supra note 16, at 343 (arguing that the
current Court refuses to find that benevolence is a proper motive for any statute that in-
cludes an intentional race-based classification).
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classification seeks to "foster equality."22' In other words, because a
proper motive underlies the intentional classification, the Court should
more readily find the classification valid.222
The inherent dilemma is that racial classifications of any kind impose a
burden on one class, while providing a benefit to another.223 The dis-
senting Justices argued that the burden imposed on the majority by
affirmative action-type racial classifications is merely incidental and tem-
porary.224 The Equal Protection Clause, however, stands for the proposi-
221. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Unfortunately, benign prefer-
ences, even when truly "benign," may actually harm the recipients of the preferences. Id.
at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). Justice Thomas expressed his
vehement opposition to benign racial preferences because they "stamp minorities with a
badge of inferiority" and indicate that the recipients of the preferences cannot compete on
their own due to some immutable characteristic linked to their race. Id. In Croson, Justice
O'Connor expressed a similar view: "Classifications based on race carry a danger of stig-
matic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact pro-
mote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility." City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.). Those
opposing affirmative action programs often rely on this argument. See, e.g., Braswell et al.,
supra note 6, at 411-13 (describing the social costs of affirmative action programs, including
the stigma attached to those receiving racial preferences, and the hostility that affirmative
action provokes in those not receiving racial preferences).
222. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2121 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that
the difference in motive is significant. Id. He asserted that consistency "would disregard
the difference between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat." Id. He also empha-
sized the ease with which "people understand the difference between good intentions and
bad." Id.
Over the years, however, the Court has indicated three major concerns regarding its
ability to distinguish between "benign" and "invidious" classifications. Strasser, supra note
16, at 344. First, the Court questions its ability to recognize improper motives. Id. Second,
the Court distrusts outright claims of benign purpose. Id. Finally, the Court fears the
negative effects that may result from a purportedly benign classification. Id. Similarly, the
Adarand majority expressed the concern that "it may not always be clear that a so-called
preference is in fact benign." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
The difficulty of distinguishing between the two types of racial classifications makes the
application of two different standards extremely risky. Justice Stevens's dual-standard ap-
proach would render the courts susceptible to applying intermediate scrutiny to a preferen-
tial program that was benign in theory, but invidious in fact, thereby enabling the courts to
participate in the perpetuation of the governmental racial discrimination sought to be erad-
icated. See Devins, supra note 143, at 146-47 (discussing the dangers of intermediate scru-
tiny review).
223. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114 ("Consistency does recognize that any individual
suffers an injury when he or she is disadvantaged by the government because of his or her
race, whatever that race may be."). Justice Thomas added, "It should be obvious that
every racial classification helps, in a narrow sense, some races and hurts others." Id. at
2119 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
224. See, e.g., id. at 2133-34 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the incidental cost
imposed on the majority by affirmative action programs is reasonable because "it is a price
to be paid only temporarily").
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tion that laws must be equal in application.225 Equal protection mandates
that race-based laws resulting in oppression of the minority must be ad-
judged on the same basis as similar laws that burden the majority, even if
only incidentally.226 Thus, the majority properly concluded that because
invidious racial classifications demand strict scrutiny review, so too must
all benign racial classifications used by the government be subject to strict
scrutiny.227
3. Congruence
The notion of congruence as a justification for mandating strict scrutiny
across the board contradicts, to some extent, the reasoning articulated
in recent Supreme Court decisions addressing affirmative action pro-
22grams. 28 In reviewing the historical development of equal protection ju-
risprudence, the majority concluded that equal protection analysis under
the Fifth Amendment is the same as under the Fourteenth Amend-
225. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1; see supra note 1 (quoting the text of Section One of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
226. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.). In Bakke, Justice Powell articulated the true meaning of equal protection in
the affirmative action context: "The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing
when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another
color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal." Id.
227. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113. Strict scrutiny review also alleviates the difficulty
courts may have in distinguishing between benign and invidious classifications. Id. at 2112.
Justice O'Connor, in her opinion in Croson, explained the necessity of utilizing strict scru-
tiny for this reason:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based meas-
ures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are "benign" or
"remedial" and what classifications are in fact motivated by.illegitimate notions of
racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is
to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
228. Recent decisions have created a federal-state dichotomy to justify applying differ-
ent standards of review when governments attempt to remedy prior racial discrimination.
See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990) (maintaining that
Congress's broad power to enforce the Fourteenth. Amendment justifies the utilization of a
less stringent standard of scrutiny to review benign federal preference programs), over-
ruled in part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Croson, 488
U.S. at 490-92 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (justifying the application of strict scrutiny review
of state affirmative action programs by positing the notion that states are not as able as
Congress to determine the necessity of such programs); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 472 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (granting an "appropriate" level of deference to
Congress in scrutinizing a federal affirmative action program); see also supra notes 141-42
and accompanying text (discussing the federal-state distinction and the standard of review
applicable to affirmative action programs).
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ment.229 In recent decisions addressing the government's imposition of
racial classifications for benign purposes, however, several Justices have
advocated granting Congress greater deference than state or local gov-
ernments when reviewing affirmative action programs.230 Nonetheless,
these Justices apparently did not intend for this increased deference to
result in the application of a lower level of scrutiny to racial classifications
imposed by the federal government. 231 Requiring Congress's programs
to undergo strict scrutiny review by the courts "does not contravene any
principle of appropriate respect for a co-equal Branch of the
Government. 2
32
229. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111; see supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the judicial tradition of treating state and federal equal protection claims in the
same manner).
230. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 521-25 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Id. at
490 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
231. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114 (discussing the appropriate level of deference that
should be granted to Congress in its enactment of affirmative action programs-the same
as that owed to the states). Judge Fried has argued that while Congress may be entitled to
greater deference due to its constitutional authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, this greater deference should not determine the applicable standard of review.
Fried, supra note 143, at 114-15. Furthermore, he noted that more deference should be
granted to Congress in its discrimination fact-finding abilities, and its power to undertake
the appropriate remedy. Id. at 114. This deference, however, "in no way alters the sub-
stantive standards that determine what does or does not violate the Constitution." Id.
Judge Fried agreed with Adarand's notion of congruence: "Nothing in Fullilove or in com-
mon sense suggests that equal protection can mean one thing for the Congress and another
thing for every other level and organ of government." Id. at 117.
Indeed, the dual-standard approach posed a variety of problems for the courts in deter-
mining how to correctly apply strict and intermediate scrutiny. Rogers, supra note 143, at
118. In addition, certain programs may not easily be labeled federal, state, or local, causing
confusion as to the applicable standard of review. Id. at 119.
232. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114. In dissent, Justice Stevens contended that the federal
government has greater "institutional. competence" than the states to redress past race
discrimination, and thus Congress should be afforded greater deference. Id. at 2125 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). While Justice Stevens was correct in recognizing the Court's recent
expositions distinguishing federal and state abilities to remedy past discrimination, he
failed to recognize that these distinctions were drawn within the past fifteen years since the
Fullilove decision. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472-73 (1980) (opinion of Bur-
ger, C.J.) (asserting the importance of according Congress the appropriate level of defer-
ence in its power to uphold equal protection of the laws). The historical development of
equal protection law prior to Fullilove, as described by the majority, stands for the proposi-
tion that the federal government owes the same duty as the state and local governments in
upholding the equal protection guarantee. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text
(highlighting the Court's historical commitment to this proposition).
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B. Confidence or Confusion? How Should Courts Apply
Strict Scrutiny?
In Adarand, the Supreme Court ultimately directed lower courts to ap-
ply the strict scrutiny standard of review to all governmental racial classi-
fications allegedly violative of equal protection rights.233 The Court
remanded the case for further review under this standard.234 The conclu-
sion drawn by the majority, however, is not a "death knell" for federal
affirmative action programs. 35 Rather, strict scrutiny review ensures that
the federal government, like state and local governments, will use racial
classifications only when they are narrowly tailored to furthering a com-
pelling governmental interest.236
By not applying strict scrutiny to the Adarand program, however, the
Court failed to provide adequate guidance to the lower courts in their
233. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
234. Id. at 2118.
235. See id. at 2117. It has been hypothesized that strict scrutiny analysis is "'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court. A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). Indeed, in her dissent in Adarand, Justice Ginsburg ex-
pressed a fear of this result. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see
supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text (discussing the dissent authored by Justice
Ginsburg).
It is possible for affirmative action programs to survive strict scrutiny. See Peightal v.
Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1562 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding a county's race-
based hiring program for firefighters under strict scrutiny); see also Strasser, supra note 16,
at 346 (arguing that the use of strict scrutiny does not demand that all race-based statutes
be invalidated). But see Long v. City of Saginaw, 911 F.2d 1192, 1203 (6th Cir. 1990) (in-
validating a city's race-based hiring program for police officers under strict scrutiny). In-
deed, many affirmative action programs still exist at the state and local level, even after
Croson mandated strict scrutiny review of these programs. Memorandum from Walter
Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, to General Counsels Re: Adarand 28 (June 28,
1995) [hereinafter Memo].
236. Adarand 115 S. Ct. at 2117. Justice O'Connor further stated, "We think that re-
quiring strict scrutiny is the best way to ensure that courts will consistently give racial
classifications that kind of detailed examination, both as to ends and as to means." Id.
The majority, except Justice Scalia, expressly conceded that governments have the ca-
pacity to remedy the effects of past racial discrimination through affirmative action pro-
grams as long as those programs are necessary to further a compelling interest and are
narrowly tailored. Id. at 2117. But see id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that the
government can never have a compelling interest in discriminating to remedy prior dis-
crimination). For example, Justice O'Connor discussed the Court's decision in United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987), as indicative of the continued ability of the govern-
ment to institute affirmative action programs. Id. at 2117. In that case, the Court found
that the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama had the authority
to impose a one-black-one-white promotion scheme on the Alabama Department of Public
Safety because the scheme was narrowly tailored to remedying the Department's "perva-
sive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct." Paradise, 480 U.S. at 167.
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future application of strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs.237
The Court provided only minimal instruction to the lower court, directing
it to determine whether the government has a compelling interest in
utilizing minority-based financial incentives in subcontracts, and whether
the program was narrowly tailored to further that interest.238 The Court
237. Memo, supra note 235, at 9. Because the Court did not determine the constitu-
tionality of the program in Adarand, future judicial analysis of affirmative action programs
must be based on Croson and subsequent lower court decisions applying strict scrutiny to
state and local governmental affirmative action programs. Id. at 2. Although strict scru-
tiny now applies to both federal and state affirmative action programs, some commentators
suggest that courts may defer to Congress more readily in applying strict scrutiny to federal
remedial affirmative action programs. See id. at 9 (speculating that, "even under strict
scrutiny, programs statutorily prescribed by Congress may be entitled to greater deference
than programs adopted by state and local governments."). Hence, the strict scrutiny stan-
dards developed in Croson may not apply as strictly to the federal government. Id.
238. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118. These directions are merely an elaboration of the
strict scrutiny standard. Because Croson sets the standards for strict scrutiny review of
state and local governmental classifications, courts must look to its guidelines to determine
whether a federal affirmative action program is narrowly tailored and furthers a compel-
ling government interest. Memo, supra note 235, at 8-9.
The ends most frequently served by affirmative action programs are remedial, alleviating
the effects of prior discrimination. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102 (remedying the
effects of past discrimination in the construction industry); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (same); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.) (remedying the effects of
prior discrimination in the employment of teachers); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
481 (1980) (remedying the effects of prior discrimination in the construction industry).
Croson requires the government to provide a "strong basis in evidence" of the need for
these types of affirmative action programs. Memo, supra note 235, at 11 (quoting Croson,
488 U.S. at 500). This includes probative statistical evidence of discrimination in the partic-
ular industry or region. Id. at 12. Other plausible proof, although insufficient on its own,
may include anecdotal evidence, such as complaints or testimony. See Contractors Ass'n
of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 1002-03 (3d Cir. 1993) (evaluating anec-
dotal evidence in addition to other evidence of prior discrimination). Finally, while not
specifically addressed in Croson, it appears that the government may present evidence not
relied upon previously in the enactment of the program. Memo, supra note 235, at 13-14;
see, e.g., Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1521
(10th Cir. 1994); Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1004; Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941
F.2d 910, 920 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992).
Whether non-remedial objectives, such as the achievement of diversity in a particular
setting, survive strict scrutiny is uncertain after both Croson and Adarand. Memo, supra
note 235, at 14-19. Both Bakke and Metro Broadcasting involved attempts to achieve di-
versity through affirmative action programs, the former in an institution of higher educa-
tion, the latter in the broadcast industry. See supra notes 94-103 and 134-42 (discussing the
Bakke and Metro Broadcasting opinions respectively). Justice Stevens argued that the ma-
jority in Adarand did not overrule the validity of diversity as a legitimate government goal.
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The proposition that fostering diver-
sity may provide a sufficient interest to justify such a program is not inconsistent with the
Court's holding today-indeed, the question is not remotely presented in this case").
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated an affirm-
ative action program at the University of Texas School of Law because the program im-
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further suggested that the lower court determine whether there was an
alternative race-neutral means to achieve the governmental objective.239
Finally, the Court directed the lower court to determine whether the pol-
icy was temporary, lasting no longer than the "discriminatory effects it
[was] designed to eliminate." 40 This limited guidance grants the lower
courts ample freedom in assessing the constitutionality of federal affirma-
tive action programs, and will likely cause discrepancies among courts as
to which types of programs pass strict scrutiny review.4 '
properly used race as a factor in admissions decisions. Hopwood v. Texas, 1996 WL
120235, at *26 (5th Cir. March 18, 1996). The school justified its use of race on three
grounds, including the achievement of a diverse student body. Id. Using strict scrutiny
analysis, the court found that attaining diversity was not a compelling interest. Id. at *13.
The court stated that, "the use of race in admissions for diversity in higher education con-
tradicts, rather than furthers, the aims of equal protection." Id. at *11.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2583 (1996). Justice
Ginsburg, however, filed an opinion joined by Justice Souter, explaining that because the
program at issue had been discontinued, the Court "must await a final judgment on a
program genuinely in controversy before addressing the important question raised in this
petition." Id. (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). Thus, the question of whether diversity may be a
compelling government interest remains to be determined by the Supreme Court. See id.
(refusing to evaluate the rationale of the court of appeals). In the meantime, the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari "casts doubt on all affirmative action programs in Texas, Louisi-
ana, and Mississippi-the three states covered by the [Fifth Circuit]." Joan Biskupic, Jus-
tices Decline to Hear Campus Diversity Case, WASH, POST, July 2, 1996, at Al, A9.
To determine whether a program is narrowly tailored, courts must review certain factors
developed in various cases: (1) whether the government considered race-neutral alterna-
tives before enacting the program; (2) the program's scope; (3) whether race alone may
determine eligibility for a program, or is merely one factor in eligibility requirements; (4)
statistical comparisons between the number of qualified minorities in a particular industry
and participation goals of the program; (5) the duration of the program; (6) the burden
imposed by the program on non-minorities. Memo, supra note 235, at 19. As noted previ-
ously, courts may more readily defer to Congress when applying the strict scrutiny test to
federal affirmative action programs. See supra, notes 228-32 (discussing the federal-state
distinction regarding the deference issue); Memo, supra note 235, at 30-34 (suggesting that
the Croson standards may apply "somewhat more loosely" to federal programs).
239. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118. This is one factor in determining whether a program
is narrowly tailored. See supra note 238 (listing the various factors).
240. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 513
(1980) (Powell, J., concurring)). This too is one factor courts should consider when analyz-
ing a program's narrow tailoring.
241. Courts already have experienced difficulties applying strict scrutiny review to state
and local programs following the Croson decision. See Nicole Duncan, Note, Croson Re-
visited: A Legacy of Uncertainty in the Application of Strict Scrutiny, 26 COLUM. HUM.
Rrs. L. REv. 679, 684 (1995) (discussing the problems lower courts have had in determin-
ing whether the program at issue satisfies the strict scrutiny requirements of Croson). Be-
cause of the uncertainty, lower courts have avoided applying the two-part strict scrutiny
test, choosing instead to determine the validity of an affirmative action program by com-
paring the program at issue with the program in Croson, or by resolving the issue using the
doctrines of standing or mootness. Id. at 680-81.
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Some have argued that because of the recent judicial articulation of a
federal-state distinction concerning the level of deference owed to legisla-
tors,242 courts, in their application of strict scrutiny to federal remedial
affirmative action programs, should more readily defer to Congress.243 In
a recent Department of Justice memorandum concerning Adarand, an
Assistant Attorney General suggested that courts, when analyzing the
propriety of federal affirmative action programs under the strict scrutiny
standard, may be entitled to grant Congress greater deference.244 Doing
so, however, would frustrate the purpose of strict scrutiny and instead
create a fourth standard of review less stringent than strict scrutiny, but
more strict than intermediate scrutiny.245 The Adarand Court clearly
Even when a court does apply strict scrutiny, there are discrepancies as to the amount of
statistical and historical evidence needed to satisfy the test. Id. at 684-85. State and local
government actors utilizing affirmative action programs after Croson must provide a suffi-
cient factual record supporting their determination that discriminatory effects still exist,
and provide evidence that they used a high level of specificity in creating the affirmative
action remedy. Id. at 684 n.18 (citing Janice R. Franke, Defining the Parameters of Permis-
sible State and Local Affirmative Action Programs, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 387, 388
(1994)). For example, in O'Donnell Const, Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420 (D.C.
Cir. 1992), two white owners of a construction company challenged a District of Columbia
law requiring that 35% of all contracts go to minority-owned businesses. Id. at 421-22.
While the lower court found that the statistical evidence provided by the city was sufficient
to demonstrate past discrimination, the appellate court determined that the program
lacked the specificity required by Croson. Id. at 427. On remand, the Government in the
Adarand case must be prepared to provide adequate statistical evidence of the lingering
effects of past discrimination in the Colorado construction industry, as well as prove that
the financial incentives provided to minority contractors were narrowly drawn to remedy
the prior discriminatory effects.
242. See supra notes 228-32 (discussing the federal-state dichotomy regarding the
amount of deference owed to governmental affirmative action programs).
243. Memo, supra note 235, at 2; see also Fried, supra note 143, at 114 (discussing the
propriety of granting Congress greater deference in fact-finding).
While there may be some merit to the argument that Congress should be entitled to
greater deference in its enactment of remedial affirmative action programs, based on its
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers, this argument seems to fail in the non-reme-
dial context. See Memo, supra note 235, at 33 (noting that because Congress's enforce-
ment powers are not implicated, the dissenting Justices in Metro Broadcasting could not
sanction the grant of greater deference to federal minority preference programs aimed at
promoting broadcast diversity).
244. Memo, supra note 235, at 2, 30. For example, the author stated that:
It is unclear, however, what differences will emerge in the application of strict
scrutiny to affirmative action by the national government; in particular, the
[Adarand] Court expressly left open the question of what deference the judiciary
should give to determinations by Congress that affirmative action is necessary to
remedy discrimination against racial and ethnic minority groups.
Id. at 2. Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger further suggested that the Adarand
Court "hinted" that Croson's standards may apply less stringently to review of the federal
government's affirmative action programs. Id. at 30.
245. Strict scrutiny review essentially allows courts to take an independent look at legis-
lation without deferring to the judgments of lawmakers. See supra note 15 (discussing the
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:1405
mandated strict scrutiny review of all affirmative action programs without
discussing the issue of deference.246 Thus, the plausibility of courts defer-
ring more readily to Congress's enactment of affirmative action programs
ended with Adarand's strict scrutiny mandate.
C. A Look Ahead
The Adarand decision already has had a profound impact on affirma-
tive action programs across the United States.2 47 Following the decision,
President Clinton ordered a review of all federal affirmative action pro-
grams, culminating in an outline of standards that federal programs must
meet.248 The Justice Department, after its own review, eliminated a
Defense Department minority preference rule used in contracting, citing
the program's failure to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard.249 Addition-
traditional strict scrutiny analysis). If courts defer, the standard of review is no longer
"strict." Id.
246. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995) (explaining
that "classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that fur-
ther compelling governmental interests").
247. See, e.g., Virginia Ellis, Wilson Defies U.S., Cuts Hiring Goals for Road Contracts,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23,1995, at Al (describing California Governor Pete Wilson's decision to
reduce a state-wide minority construction hiring goal from 20 to 10 percent); Fern Shen,
Contractors Sue WSSC Over Minority Program, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1995, at C6 (exam-
ining the decision of various contractors to challenge the constitutionality of the Washing-
ton Suburban Sanitation Commission's minority set-aside program); Amy Wallace, UC
Regents Set Preferences Ban for Spring 1998, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1996, at Al (discussing
the decision of University of California Board of Regents to eliminate racial and gender
preferences in admissions decisions beginning in 1998).
Popular consensus also forecasts that Adarand will have a significant impact on affirma-
tive action programs. See Cassandra Burrell, Federal task force examining affirmative ac-
tion programs, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 25, 1995, at A9 (quoting Representative Charles
Canady's (R-FL) prediction that affirmative action programs will be invalidated and race
will "come to play a smaller role in the federal legal landscape").
Even though Adarand may not directly affect specific programs, the decision makes jus-
tification of all affirmative action programs more difficult. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Los
Angeles Racial Preferences Are Voided, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1995, at B9 (explaining the
recent invalidation of the Los Angeles Transit Authority's minority set-aside program on
the grounds that it failed the "narrowly tailored" prong of the strict scrutiny test).
Indeed, the affirmative action controversy has come to the forefront in recent months.
See, e.g., Cathleen Decker, Backers Rally for Affirmative Action, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23,
1996, at B9 (discussing the "Freedom Summer 1996" campaign aimed at opposing Califor-
nia's support for an initiative ending affirmative action); Dan Morain, Petitions Turned in
for Affirmative Action Ban, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1996, at Al (describing the collection in
California of over one million signatures to place an anti-bigotry "California civil rights
initiative" provision on the November 1996 election ballot).
248. Michael K. Frisby & Viveca Novak, President to Outline Broad Standards to Keep
Affirmative Action Programs, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1995, at B8.
249. Ann Devroy, Rule Aiding Minority Firms to End, WASH. PosT, Oct. 22, 1995, at
Al, A8.
1456
Adarand's Effect on Affirmative Action
ally, the University of California Board of Regents decided to eliminate
race and gender as criteria in its hiring, admissions, and contracting
programs.250
Because of the uncertainty challengers face in predicting the outcome
of the various courts' application of strict scrutiny, the future likely holds
a marked increase in litigation threatening the legitimacy of the govern-
ment's use of racial preferences in affirmative action programs.25' Thus,
the continued existence of governmental affirmative action programs re-
mains largely uncertain.252
IV. CONCLUSION
The controversy surrounding affirmative action has not subsided since
its inception. The Supreme Court has struggled consistently to determine
the constitutionality of programs based on a fundamentally despised con-
cept: classifying according to race. The Adarand decision, requiring
courts to apply strict scrutiny to all governmental racial classifications,
250. Craig Donegan, Affirmative Action-A diversity of views are found on university
campuses, SAN ArrroNlo EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 19, 1995, at B6. While California has taken
what some would consider a radical step, other states are not far behind. Colorado's
Attorney General, Gale Norton, recently recommended the elimination of Colorado's
affirmative action programs. John Sanko, Norton: Dump Affirmative Action, ROCKY
MOUNrAIN NEWS, Oct. 26, 1995, at 8A. She cited the Adarand case as requiring a showing
of intentional discrimination to justify the state's affirmative action measures, which she
said "would be hard to claim." Id. Norton instead suggested race-neutral remedies to
achieve racial equality. Id.
251. The Court's decision already has sparked litigation. See, e.g., Devroy, supra note
249, at A8 (discussing a pending federal court case in New Mexico challenging the "rule of
two," which the Defense Department recently eliminated); Wade Lambert, Chinese-Amer-
ican Students Sue to Kill Affirmative-Action Plan, WALL ST. J., July 25, 1995, at B16
(describing a challenge by a group of minorities to the San Francisco School District's 12-
year old desegregation plan); Joseph Mallia & Andrea Estes, Latin School sued over race,
BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 15, 1995, at 1 (describing a father's suit against the Boston Latin
School's use of racial quotas); Shen, supra note 247, at C6 (reviewing the lawsuit filed by
Maryland contractors to eliminate minority preferences by the Washington Suburban Sani-
tation Commission). While there is disagreement as to which programs might survive strict
scrutiny review, there is little doubt that Adarand will provoke a significant number of
lawsuits concerning affirmative action. See Kenneth Jost, After Adarand, 81 A.B.A. J. 70,
71 (Sept. 1995) (commenting that Adarand "means gearing up for massive protracted
litigation").
252. There are mixed opinions as to whether affirmative action programs will meet
strict scrutiny requirements. Jost, supra note 251, at 70. Some believe that few programs
will survive, while others contend that survival of specific programs will depend on the
facts of the case, as well as on the presiding judges. Id. Because the Adarand decision did
not address certain additional controversial issues surrounding affirmative action, litigation
of these issues can also be expected. See supra notes 238-46 (discussing the uncertainty
regarding the amount of deference owed to Congress, and the proffer of diversity as a
compelling interest).
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logically adds uniformity to the judicial analysis of affirmative action pro-
grams. The affirmative action struggle, however, does not end here.
Courts must determine the proper application of strict scrutiny to federal
and state programs. While uncertainty remains, the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review will ensure that governmental affirmative action programs
do not violate equal protection rights.
Mary J. Reyburn
